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Options for Taxing 
U.S. Multinational Corporations
Summary
In 2008, 12 percent of all federal revenues came from 
corporate income taxes; about half was paid by multi-
national corporations reporting income from foreign 
countries.1 How the federal government taxes U.S. 
multinational corporations has consequences for the 
U.S. economy overall as well as for the federal budget. 
Tax policies influence businesses’ choices about how and 
where to invest, particularly as corporations assess 
whether it is more profitable to locate business operations 
in the United States or abroad. The tax laws also can 
create opportunities for tax avoidance by allowing multi-
national corporations to use accounting or other legal 
strategies to report income and expenses for their U.S. 
and foreign operations in ways that reduce their overall 
tax liability. U.S tax revenues decline when firms move 
investments abroad or when they strategically allocate 
income and expenses to avoid paying taxes here.
A country can take two general approaches to taxing the 
income of corporations that operate both domestically 
and abroad: 
 Under a worldwide approach, the home country 
considers all of the income of its multinational corpo-
rations to be taxable, regardless of where that income 
is earned. But to avoid taxing income twice—in the 
home country and in the country where it is earned—
a country would generally allow multinational 
corporations to claim a foreign tax credit against 
domestic tax liability for taxes paid elsewhere. 
 Under a territorial approach, the home country taxes 
only the income earned within its borders. 
No major developed country has adopted either approach 
entirely. Although many developed countries use a more 
territorial approach, the system in the United States 
leans toward a worldwide approach, but one that allows 
multinational corporations to defer or, in some cases, 
completely avoid paying U.S. taxes on some income they 
earn abroad. 
This study examines policy options that could move the 
United States closer to one system or the other, along 
with several approaches to addressing particular concerns 
about the current system of taxation. All would affect 
multinational corporations’ investment strategies and 
reporting of income as well as U.S. revenues from 
corporate income taxes.
Current Federal Tax Treatment of 
U.S. Multinational Corporations
The U.S. government taxes both the domestic and the 
foreign income of businesses that are incorporated in the 
United States and that operate abroad. Often, such cor-
porations also must pay income taxes to their foreign host 
countries. At the national level, the top corporate tax rate 
in the United States (the statutory tax rate on income in 
the highest bracket) is 35 percent. When combined 
with state and local corporate taxes, that rate rises to 
39 percent—higher than that in any of the other 34 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). Weighted by 
gross domestic product (GDP), the average statutory rate 
among OECD countries in 2011, excluding the United 
States, was about 19 percent. 
1. That year is the most recent for which detailed data are available. 
Since then, receipts from corporate income taxes have accounted 
for a smaller share of federal revenues—ranging from 7 percent in 
2009 to 10 percent in 2012.
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Although the U.S. system is generally more worldwide 
than territorial, two important features of its tax system 
depart from the worldwide approach. First, a purely 
worldwide tax system would ensure that firms faced the 
same tax rate no matter where they operated. If the 
United States were to have such a system, it would not 
limit the credit granted to firms for the total taxes paid 
abroad, regardless of whether those taxes exceeded the 
domestic liability on the income. Under the U.S. system, 
however, the largest credit a corporation may take is one 
that matches the amount the firm would pay in U.S. 
taxes on the same income. Thus, U.S. corporations that 
operate in countries that tax at a higher rate than the 
United States does must pay the foreign tax rate on that 
income. Second, companies can defer U.S. taxes on 
income earned abroad by their subsidiaries until that 
income is remitted (or “repatriated”) to the U.S. parent 
company, thus allowing some foreign income to escape 
U.S. taxation—at least temporarily. 
Those features of the U.S. tax system affect U.S. multi-
nationals’ decisions about whether and how to invest at 
home and abroad. The current tax system provides incen-
tives for U.S. firms to locate their production facilities in 
countries with low taxes as a way to reduce their tax lia-
bility at home. Those responses to the tax system reduce 
economic efficiency because the firms are not allocating 
resources to their most productive use. Those responses 
also reduce the income of shareholders and employees in 
the United States and they lead to a loss of federal 
tax revenue. In addition, those investment decisions may 
initially result in more unemployment in this country. 
Over time, however, as the economy adjusts, other jobs 
are created and total employment would not be signifi-
cantly affected. But as a result of such decisions, in the 
long run, total compensation for U.S. workers is lower, 
and employment may be concentrated in different 
industries and regions.
The current system also creates incentives to shift 
reported income to low-tax countries without changing 
actual investment decisions. Such profit shifting erodes 
the corporate tax base and leads to wasted resources for 
tax planning.
Policy Options
The options presented in this report are targeted at 
several areas of concern about the effects of the U.S. tax 
system on the flow of investment outside the United 
States and the reporting of U.S. corporate profits. Some 
options are broad, designed generally to address the flows 
of U.S. investment to other countries. Other options are 
narrower, addressing tax avoidance by U.S. firms that 
strategically allocate reported income and expenses 
between their U.S. and foreign operations. Some options 
would result in a more efficient allocation of resources 
among countries and also would impede the ability of 
corporations to avoid paying U.S. taxes; others would 
achieve just one of those two goals and could in fact make 
it more difficult to achieve the other.
A Worldwide System. Options that would move the 
United States closer to a purely worldwide tax system—
by eliminating or curtailing deferral of U.S. taxes on 
income earned abroad—would dampen incentives to 
shift investment or reported income on the basis of con-
cerns about tax liability. As a result, those options would 
generally lead to more economically efficient business 
investment and increase corporate tax revenues from 
firms that remained incorporated in the United States. 
But moving closer to a purely worldwide system also 
would strengthen the incentive for U.S. firms to incorpo-
rate, or register, abroad or to be acquired by or merge 
with foreign companies. Such a response probably would 
not increase the efficiency of investment decisions, and it 
would reduce the corporate tax base. On balance, how-
ever, eliminating deferral would boost both efficiency and 
tax revenues. In fact, eliminating deferral entirely would 
boost U.S. tax revenues by more than $100 billion over a 
10-year period, according to an estimate by the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT); that would be 
the largest revenue increase attributable to any of the 
options discussed in this report. 
A Territorial System. Alternatively, the United States 
could move toward a territorial system—for example, 
by exempting some income earned abroad from U.S. 
taxation or by taxing domestic income only but using a 
formula that considered the location of a company’s 
activities to determine the sources of its income. Such 
policies could result in a less efficient allocation of 
resources among countries by increasing incentives to 
shift business operations and reported income to coun-
tries with lower tax rates. Nonetheless, some options for 
moving toward a territorial tax would increase U.S. tax 
revenues by restricting the ability of multinationals to 
shield some income from U.S. taxation and by preventing 
them from deducting costs incurred abroad from income 
earned in the United States.
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Other Options. Some options would restrict corporations’ 
ability to use excess foreign tax credits, which are gener-
ated by income earned in countries where taxes are higher 
than they are in the United States. Under current law, a 
business can use those credits to offset U.S. taxes on 
income that is repatriated from low-tax countries, effec-
tively decreasing the U.S. taxes they pay on foreign 
income and increasing their incentive to invest abroad. 
Thus, restricting the use of excess credits could increase 
federal tax revenues and reduce the incentive to invest 
abroad. Such a restriction, however, might push some 
firms to take greater advantage of provisions that allow 
deferral of taxes on income that is earned—and 
retained—abroad. The net effects of such a restriction on 
investment and repatriation of income are unclear, but it 
could increase U.S. tax revenues.
Other options would produce more incremental changes, 
generally limiting opportunities for corporations to shift 
reported income abroad and thus increasing the amount 
they must pay in U.S. taxes. Those options would treat 
entities and recognize income in a more consistent way 
across jurisdictions. One disadvantage is that such 
options also would strengthen incentives for shifting 
investments instead of just shifting reported income. 
However, such options are fairly narrow, and the overall 
effect on the location of businesses’ investments would 
probably be small. 
Two Basic Approaches to Taxing 
Multinational Corporations
Multinational corporations are businesses that incorpo-
rate and operate in one country (in this report called 
the home country) but that also maintain operations of 
various kinds in other countries (called host countries). 
Multinational corporations operate abroad for many rea-
sons, including favorable tax laws, but they also do so to 
gain access to foreign markets, to employ a less costly 
labor force, and to obtain materials that are less expensive 
than those available at home. 
There are two basic approaches to taxing the income of 
multinational corporations: the worldwide approach and 
the territorial approach. Under the first system, multi-
national corporations are taxed by the home country on 
their worldwide income without regard to where it is 
earned. Countries that adopt such an approach generally 
also provide for credits or deductions for taxes paid to 
host countries. At the other end of the spectrum, under 
the territorial approach, the home country taxes only the 
income that is earned within its borders, and it imposes 
no tax liability for any income earned abroad. 
Each approach has different implications for the tax rates 
multinational firms face on income earned in foreign 
countries. If a country adopted a worldwide tax system 
with no limits on the size of its foreign tax credit (even if 
the foreign taxes exceeded domestic tax liability on the 
income), then all corporations’ income—whether earned 
at home or from investments abroad—would be taxed at 
the home country’s rate. 
Under a territorial system, by contrast, multinational 
corporations’ tax liability would depend on the rate set 
by the host country, and the only way to ensure that all 
of a country’s multinational corporations faced the same 
tax rate—regardless of the source of their income—
would be to have a universal, territorial tax system under 
which all countries treated multinational firms the same 
way—that is, having the same tax base and rate structure. 
How a home country taxes foreign-earned income can 
affect businesses in a significant way: Because many other 
countries in which such firms operate also tax income 
earned within their borders, business managers must 
decide whether investing abroad would he worthwhile, 
given the prospect of paying additional U.S. taxes on that 
same income. 
Different countries take different approaches to and have 
different systems for taxing income earned abroad. No 
major developed country has adopted either a completely 
worldwide or a completely territorial tax system. Instead, 
many have developed what are essentially hybrid systems 
that incorporate significant aspects of both approaches. 
The U.S. tax system leans toward a worldwide approach; 
it imposes taxes on multinational corporations’ foreign 
income but allows those businesses to claim deductions 
or credits for the taxes they pay abroad. Multinational 
corporations also can defer or, in some cases, completely 
avoid paying U.S. taxes on some income earned abroad. 
Deferral and some other mechanisms make the U.S. 
system territorial in some respects.
In contrast, most member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development take a 
largely territorial approach by exempting certain 
foreign-earned income from taxation (by means of what 
is often called an exemption system). Some of those
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Table 1.
Progressive Structure of U.S. 
Corporate Income Tax Rates, 2012
(Percent)
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
a. The excess tax offsets the benefit of rates below 34 percent for 
income in the range between zero and $75,000.
b. The excess tax offsets the benefit of rates below 35 percent for 
income below $10 million.
countries also have “anti-abuse” rules that govern the 
type and source of foreign income that can be exempted 
from taxation, reducing the ability of firms to take unfair 
advantage of a territorial tax system by shifting the 
location of income.2 France, for example, disallows 
exemptions for income earned in countries whose corpo-
rate income tax rates are at least 50 percent below its own. 
Germany taxes income earned in any foreign country 
where the tax rate is less than 25 percent, and it taxes all 
foreign income from certain types of business activities. 
Under Italy’s anti-abuse rules, a “blacklist” prevents 
income earned by Italian multinational corporations 
in some countries from receiving an exemption from 
taxation at home. Strong anti-abuse rules can result in 
systems that effectively tax foreign income in a way that 
is much closer to a worldwide approach.
Federal Tax Treatment of 
U.S. Multinational Corporations 
The amount of taxes that U.S. multinational corpora-
tions pay depends on several factors. As is the case for 
domestic corporations, multinationals are assessed corpo-
rate income taxes on earnings that exceed their expenses. 
Although those expenses can include taxes, current law 
generally provides for a system of credits for taxes paid to 
foreign governments that allows those companies some 
relief from what would amount to double taxation of that 
income. 
The U.S. system allows multinational corporations to 
combine credits for taxes paid to more than one foreign 
country; in 2008, those credits amounted to about 
$100 billion. Moreover, payment of U.S. taxes on foreign 
income can be deferred until the income is repatriated to 
the United States. Because of such deferral, the corpora-
tion’s total tax liability is effectively reduced if the taxes 
paid to another country are less than the amount the 
United States would levy on the same income. 
The Federal Corporate Income Tax 
The U.S. corporate tax system defines income broadly to 
include revenues from sales, interest, dividends, capital 
gains, royalties, and rents. To compute taxable income, 
corporations subtract business expenses (including the 
costs of goods sold, depreciation, advertising expenses, 
and interest payments) from their total income. Although 
corporations are allowed to deduct the interest they 
pay to bondholders, they cannot deduct dividends paid 
to shareholders; such dividends are subject to the 
individual income tax as well. 
In general, corporations’ federal income tax liability is 
computed according to a progressive structure starting at 
15 percent for the first $50,000 of taxable income 
and rising to 35 percent on income above $10 million 
(see Table 1). Income between $100,000 and $335,000 
is subject to an additional tax of 5 percent (raising the 
effective rate from 34 percent to 39 percent), and an 
additional 3 percent tax is assessed on income between 
$15 million and $18.3 million (raising the effective rate 
from 35 percent to 38 percent). For corporations with 
income in those ranges, such “excess taxes” effectively 
offset the benefit of the three lower tax rates. Although 
the excess taxes yield a higher tax rate over some income 
ranges, most corporations’ income is taxed at the 35 per-
cent rate (the statutory rate that applies to income in the 
highest tax bracket). 
It is often noted that the top rate set by U.S. law—
35 percent (or 39 percent, on average, once state and 
local corporate taxes are included)—is among the highest 
for developed countries. However, other features of the 
2. Such rules are sometimes called CFC rules because they apply to 
income from controlled foreign corporations. For a comparison of 
various national tax systems, see Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Background and Selected Issues Related to the U.S. International 
Tax System and Systems That Exempt Foreign Business Income, 
JCX-33-11 (May 20, 2011), http://go.usa.gov/gPrJ. 
Over But Not Over
0 50,000 15 0 15
50,000 75,000 25 0 25
75,000 100,000 34 0 34
100,000 335,000 34 5 a 39
335,000 10,000,000 34 0 34
10,000,000 15,000,000 35 0 35
15,000,000 18,333,333 35 3 b 38
18,333,333 — 35 0 35
Income Range (Dollars) Corporate
Tax Rate
Excess Total
Tax Rate
Statutory
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U.S. tax code, such as credits and preferential rates, effec-
tively lower the tax rates. (The appendix describes U.S. 
corporate tax rates and compares them with those of 
other countries.)
U.S. Rules for Taxation of Income Earned Abroad 
Two important features affect the U.S. tax treatment of 
foreign income. First, the foreign tax credit is limited to 
the amount of U.S. taxes a corporation would pay here 
on its income from foreign sources; a corporation may 
not take a credit on its foreign income that is larger, in 
the aggregate, than its U.S. tax liability is for that income. 
Second, payment of U.S. taxes on income earned—and 
kept—abroad can be deferred until the income is 
returned to a U.S. parent corporation. That feature adds 
a territorial aspect to the U.S. tax system in that foreign 
income receives preferential treatment. Other provisions 
and regulations (discussed later in this report) also 
contribute to a partially territorial approach.3 
Under the U.S. system, taxation of foreign income is 
affected by a corporation’s structure. In some cases, multi-
nationals operate abroad through branches that act as 
extensions of their U.S. parent companies; their foreign-
earned income is considered the legal income of the U.S. 
parent company and thus is taxed as it is earned. In other 
cases, corporations establish subsidiaries that incorporate 
as separate entities abroad. For those businesses, the par-
ent corporation owns shares in the subsidiary and receives 
income in the form of dividends, which are not subject 
to U.S. taxation until the money is returned to the U.S. 
parent. A common type of subsidiary, the controlled for-
eign corporation (CFC), is incorporated abroad and has a 
majority of its stock owned by U.S. shareholders.4
Limits on Foreign Tax Credits. When the corporate 
income tax was established in 1909, lawmakers allowed 
businesses to claim a deduction for taxes paid on income 
earned abroad. A tax deduction, however, only offsets a 
share of foreign taxes.5 That tax deduction was later 
converted to a tax credit, with no limits on the amount 
received, ensuring that income from foreign operations 
would not be taxed twice. With an unlimited credit, 
businesses that operated in countries where tax rates were 
higher than those of the United States received a tax 
credit that exceeded the U.S. tax on their foreign income 
and thus could use the excess credit to offset the U.S. tax 
on their domestic income. By comparison, businesses 
operating in low-tax countries paid the full U.S. tax on 
their domestic income. An unconstrained credit also pro-
vided an implicit U.S. subsidy of foreign governments: A 
portion of the taxes paid to those governments was in 
effect paid by the U.S. government in the form of for-
gone revenues. In response to those concerns, in 1921, 
lawmakers capped the foreign tax credit. 
Under current law, the credit cannot exceed the amount 
of taxes that a company would pay under the U.S. tax 
code. That limit ensures that the United States does not 
subsidize other countries by extending credits in excess of 
what it collects in taxes. As an example, suppose a multi-
national corporation earns $100 million in before-tax 
income in its domestic operations in the United States 
and an equal amount, currently subject to U.S. taxes, 
from the operation of its subsidiaries in other countries 
(see Table 2). Under U.S. tax law, the combined income 
is subject to a 35 percent rate—and the firm owes 
$70 million in corporate income taxes (before allowing 
for credits). Suppose the other countries tax corporate 
income earned within their borders at a rate of 40 per-
cent. The firm therefore would pay $40 million in taxes 
to the foreign countries (40 percent on the $100 million 
earned there). Under U.S. law, the firm can then claim a 
credit up to the amount it owes the United States on the 
same income—in this case, $35 million (35 percent of 
the $100 million). In this example, the firm pays 
$75 million in taxes—$35 million to the United States 
(after taking the credit) and $40 million to the other 
countries—$5 million more than it would if there was no 
limit on the amount of the credit. 
The credit that can be taken for paying foreign taxes has 
changed. Initially, there was an overall limit (as in the 
simple example above). From 1932 to 1976, the foreign 
tax credit was calculated separately for each country as a
3. See Edward Kleinbard, “Stateless Income’s Challenge to Tax 
Policy,” Tax Notes (September 5, 2011), pp. 1021–1042.
4. Although each U.S. shareholder of a given CFC must own at least 
10 percent of the stock, it is common for 100 percent of the stock 
in a CFC to be owned by a U.S. corporation. 
5. A deduction is an expense or an amount of money that reduces a 
taxpayer’s taxable income, thus reducing the tax liability by the 
amount of the deduction multiplied by the applicable tax rate. A 
credit, by contrast, is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the amount 
the taxpayer owes.
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Table 2.
Illustrative Effect of Limiting the Foreign Tax Credit on the Tax Liability of a 
U.S. Multinational Corporation
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
way to limit the ability of businesses to “cross credit” (that 
is, to use taxes paid to high-tax countries to reduce the 
U.S. tax on income from low-tax countries). Over time, 
the per-country limit has been replaced with separate lim-
its for different categories (or “baskets”) of income; the 
income from all countries is combined within each bas-
ket. Before 2007, businesses were required to calculate 
separate limits for nine different baskets. The American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 reduced that number, moving 
certain items, such as income from financial services, into 
a general-income category. There are now just two main 
categories—general income (largely, active income) and 
passive income.6 
Deferral of Taxes on Foreign Income. Since the enact-
ment of the corporate income tax in 1909, the United 
States has allowed firms to defer U.S. taxes on the income 
of foreign subsidiaries until that money is repatriated to 
the U.S. parent company. An early justification held that 
no income should be taxed before it is available for use by 
the taxpayer (just as taxes are deferred on capital gains 
realizations or pension income until those funds are 
received). Over time, concern over the ability of busi-
nesses to manipulate their foreign income led to propos-
als to restrict or eliminate deferral of taxes. Advocates 
defended deferral as a way to protect firms’ ability to 
compete with foreign businesses in countries with lower 
tax rates or a territorial approach to taxation. Those 
competing concerns have led to a deferral system that is 
somewhat constrained by limits on its use. (Those limits 
are discussed later in this report in the section “Limits on 
Deferral.”)
Under current law, U.S. multinational corporations are 
taxed only on the income of subsidiaries that are incorpo-
rated abroad to the extent that the income from those 
U.S. Income 100 100
Repatriated Foreign Income 100 100___ ___
Total Income 200 200
U.S. Taxes Before Foreign Tax Credit
Rate (Percent) 35 35
Liability (Millions of dollars) 70 70
Foreign Taxes
Rate (Percent) 40 40
Liability (Millions of dollars) 40 40
Foreign Tax Credit (Millions of dollars) 40 35
U.S. Taxes 30 35
Foreign Taxes 40 40__ __
Total Taxes 70 75
U.S. and Foreign Tax Liability After the Credit (Millions of dollars)
No Limit on Tax  Credit Foreign Income Is Subject to U.S. Taxes
Tax Credit Limited to Amount Owed If 
U.S. and Foreign Tax Liability and the Foreign Tax Credit
Before-Tax Income (Millions of dollars)
If There Were
Current Law:
6. Active and passive income are discussed in more detail later in this 
report. The tax code identifies two other categories for special 
treatment. The first consists of income from investments in 
countries with which the United States does not have diplomatic 
relations and from countries that support terrorism: Income in 
that category is not eligible for a tax credit. The other category 
consists of income that is sourced (that is, attributed) to foreign 
countries by treaty; corporations must compute the foreign tax 
credit separately for that income.
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Table 3.
Illustrative Effect of Deferral on the Tax Liability of a 
U.S. Multinational Corporation
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Credit is allowed for foreign taxes attributable to the repatriated foreign income.
operations is repatriated to the U.S. parent in the form of 
dividends. (Income earned by a branch, by contrast, is 
taxed as it is earned because branches are treated as legal 
extensions of the U.S. parent corporation.) 
In the previous example (shown in Table 2), the limit on 
the foreign tax credit reduced the appeal of investing in a 
high-tax country. By contrast, the ability to defer U.S. 
taxes on income that is not repatriated increases the 
appeal of investing in lower-tax countries. Consider again 
a U.S. parent company that earns $200 million in before-
tax income (see Table 3). Suppose $100 million of that 
income is earned from a wholly owned subsidiary in a 
host country with a tax rate of 15 percent. The multi-
national corporation in this instance reinvests half of the 
dividends in its foreign subsidiary and repatriates the 
rest to the U.S. parent. Without deferral, all foreign earn-
ings would be subject to U.S. taxes. However, under the 
current rules, the multinational does not pay U.S. taxes 
on the $50 million of the foreign earnings that remain 
abroad. Only the $50 million paid to the U.S. parent 
company is taxed at 20 percent, the amount by which the 
U.S. tax rate exceeds the foreign tax rate. Thus, deferral 
reduces the company’s U.S. tax liability by $10 million. 
If the multinational repatriates the income in some future 
year, it will owe U.S. taxes on that income. The firm still 
benefits, however, by deferring tax liability—and having 
the use of that money—until that future time.
Using Excess Credits to Shelter Income Repatriated from 
Low-Tax Countries. Because a firm’s foreign tax credit is 
limited to its U.S. tax liability, income that is repatriated 
from a country with a higher tax rate than the U.S. rate 
generates “excess credits” (that is, potential credits from 
foreign tax liabilities that cannot be used because they 
U.S. Income 100 100
Foreign Income Before Foreign Taxes
Taxable income repatriated to the parent company 50 50
Income reinvested abroad    50 50___ _____
Total Income 200 200
Income Subject to U.S. Taxes 200 150
U.S. Taxes Before Foreign Tax Credit
Rate (Percent) 35 35
Liability (Millions of dollars) 70 52.5
Foreign Taxes
Rate (Percent) 15 15
Liability (Millions of dollars) 15 15
Foreign Tax Credit (Millions of dollars) 15 7.5 a
U.S. Taxes 55 45
Foreign Taxes 15 15__ ____
Total Taxes 70 60
If There Were No Deferral Current Law: Deferral
U.S. and Foreign Tax Liability and the Foreign Tax Credit
U.S. and Foreign Tax Liability After the Credit (Millions of dollars) 
Before-Tax Income (Millions of dollars)
8 OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS JANUARY 2013
CBO
Table 4.
Illustrative Effect of Cross Crediting Under the Foreign Tax Credit on the 
Tax Liability of a U.S. Multinational Corporation
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
a. Per-country credits are shown for illustration only and are not calculated separately for U.S. tax purposes.
b. The potential credit is the foreign taxes paid on repatriated income.
c. The allowed tax credit is the smaller of the potential credit or the U.S. tax liability due on repatriated foreign income.
exceed the amount owed to the United States). A firm 
that repatriates income from a country with a lower tax 
rate would receive a credit that was not enough to offset 
the entire U.S. tax owed on that income, and the firm 
would face a residual tax in the United States. U.S. tax 
law, however, allows firms to combine the income and 
credits from high- and low-tax-rate countries on income 
tax returns. The excess credits attributed to the taxes paid 
on income earned in a high-tax country can be cross 
credited and applied to the income repatriated from the 
low-tax country, effectively offsetting some or all of 
the U.S. tax liability on income from the low-tax host 
country. 
Suppose a firm repatriates $100 million from a country 
with a 40 percent tax rate and $20 million from a country 
with a 10 percent tax rate (see Table 4). Without cross 
crediting, the firm could claim a credit of $35 million on 
Foreign Income 100 100 200
Taxable Foreign Income Repatriated to the
Parent Company 100 20 120
U.S. Taxes
Rate (Percent) 35 35 35
Liability (Millions of dollars) 35 7 42
Foreign Taxes
Rate (Percent) 40 10 n.a.
Liability (Millions of dollars) 40 10 50
Foreign Tax Credita
Potentialb 40 2 42
Allowedc 35 2 37
U.S. Taxes 0 5 5
Foreign Taxes 40 10 50
__ __ __
Total Taxes 40 15 55
Foreign Tax Credita
Potentialb 40 2 42
Allowedc 35 7 42
U.S. Taxes 0 0 0
Foreign Taxes 40 10 50__ __ __
Total Taxes 40 10 50
Country
Before-Tax Income (Millions of dollars)
Total
U.S. and Foreign Tax Liability After the Foreign Tax Credit, with Cross Crediting
U.S. and Foreign Tax Liability After the Foreign Tax Credit, with No Cross Crediting
Country
U.S. and Foreign Tax Liability Before the Foreign Tax Credit
(Millions of dollars)
(Millions of dollars)
High-Tax Low-Tax 
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its income from the high-tax country, the amount it owes 
under U.S. tax law on $100 million of earnings. The firm 
also could claim another credit for $2 million—the 
amount owed to the low-tax country on the $20 million 
repatriated from that country. However, under current 
law, that firm has excess credits of $5 million—the 
difference between the potential credit ($40 million) and 
the allowed credit ($35 million) from the taxes paid to 
the country with the higher tax rate. The U.S. firm 
can still apply the excess credit of $5 million against the 
amount due in U.S. taxes on income earned in the 
low-tax country. 
The advantages of cross crediting increase as fewer restric-
tions are placed on the foreign tax credit.7 The current 
system’s smaller number of baskets eases the way for firms 
to use cross crediting, and thereby increases the use of 
that mechanism.8
Combining Deferral and Excess Credits. Corporations 
can increase their after-tax income by retaining some 
earnings abroad in low-tax countries and using excess 
credits from high-tax countries to shelter income repatri-
ated from low-tax countries. Such actions allow them to 
avoid paying the U.S. taxes that would have been due on 
some of their income from low-tax countries. Consider 
again a firm that initially earns $100 million in the 
United States and $100 million in a country with a 
15 percent tax rate. If the company does not defer any 
income, it would have a U.S. tax liability of $70 million, 
less a foreign tax credit of $15 million, and thus would 
owe $55 million in U.S. taxes; its total tax payments 
would amount to $70 million (see the first column in 
Table 3 on page 7). Deferral, by itself, would reduce those 
taxes by $10 million (see the second column in Table 3).
Alternatively, the firm could rearrange its investments 
and use the combination of deferral and cross crediting to 
reduce its total tax liabilities even more—and eliminate 
its U.S. tax liability. For example, say the firm moves its 
domestic and foreign investments to two foreign coun-
tries—one with a rate that is higher (40 percent) and the 
other with a rate that is lower (10 percent) than the U.S. 
tax rate (the example shown in Table 4).9 If it repatriates 
$100 million from the country with the higher tax rate 
and $20 million from the country with the low tax rate, 
the company can use cross crediting to take the full credit 
of $40 million—the amount paid to the high-tax coun-
try—to eliminate the domestic tax due on income it 
repatriates from the low-tax country. Thus, by moving 
investments overseas, retaining some earnings abroad, 
and using cross crediting, the company could reduce its 
net U.S. tax liability from $55 million to zero and its 
total tax payments from $70 million to $50 million.
Deductions for Expenses. Another feature of the tax code 
that can affect the use of excess credits is the treatment of 
certain expenses incurred by the parent firm in the course 
of its general business activities. Such expenses include 
interest on loans, spending on research and development, 
and overhead. The foreign tax credit is limited to the U.S. 
tax liability on repatriated income, net of those expenses 
incurred in earning the income. Deducting the expenses 
reduces the allowable credit for firms affected by that 
limit. However, the lower limit could be used to generate 
additional excess credits from high-tax countries to shield 
income repatriated from low-tax countries from U.S. tax 
liability, thus encouraging some firms to allocate more 
expenses to their foreign earnings.
Although deductions for expenses related to doing busi-
ness abroad can reduce the foreign tax credit, those 
expenses can nevertheless be used in other ways to lower 
the company’s U.S. tax liability. When determining that 
liability before tax credits, firms need not differentiate 
between domestic and foreign expenses; all foreign 
expenses can be deducted entirely against U.S. taxable 
income to reduce total U.S. tax liability. Thus, expenses 
from foreign operations reduce U.S. tax liability, even 
before the application of the foreign tax credit. Moreover, 
the parent firm can take deductions for expenses it incurs 
for its foreign operations in the year that those expenses 
7. See Kimberly Clausing, “Tax Holidays (and Other Escapes) in the 
American Jobs Creation Act,” National Tax Journal, vol. 58, no. 3 
(September 2005), pp. 331–346.
8. See Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, “Corporate Taxes in 
a World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border 
Income,” in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., 
Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications (MIT 
Press, 2008).
9. Under both scenarios, the firm would face the same underlying 
tax rate on the new investments (before accounting for foreign tax 
credits, deferrals, and other adjustments). In the previous example 
(see Table 3), the firm faced an underlying tax rate of 25 percent 
($35 million in U.S. taxes and $15 million in foreign taxes on 
$200 million of before-tax income). In this example (see Table 4), 
it also faces an underlying tax rate of 25 percent ($40 million in 
taxes in the high-tax country and $10 million in taxes in the 
low-tax country on $200 million of before-tax income).
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are incurred—even if the related foreign income is not 
repatriated until a later year.
Limits on Deferral. Income is taxed differently according 
to how it is earned (that is, whether it is passive or active 
income) and whether it is retained abroad or paid within 
the tax year to a U.S. parent company. Passive income is 
derived from businesses that a firm owns but for which 
the firm has minimal or no involvement in operations. 
For example, income from the sales of foreign property to 
related parties would be considered passive.10 Passive 
income, often called subpart F income because of the 
portion of the tax code that specifies its treatment, is 
taxed as it is earned. Active income is generated by the 
firm in the management of its business, and it is taxed 
only when it is returned to the U.S. parent company.11 
For example, active dividends are taxed only when they 
are paid out to the U.S. parent. Additionally, some forms 
of income, such as interest, rents, and royalties, are taxed 
currently, regardless of whether they are earned passively 
or actively, because the money is paid immediately to the 
U.S. earner. 
Because government tax administrators cannot readily 
identify the source of passive income, it is easier to make 
financial arrangements to shift passive income to low-tax 
countries and escape U.S. taxation than it is to do the 
same with active income. If passive income was not taxed 
when earned, it would be possible for U.S. multinational 
corporations to defer paying taxes on all investment 
income, including that from U.S. businesses, by investing 
through foreign entities. That is not possible under 
subpart F because investment in U.S. property by 
U.S.-controlled foreign corporations is subject to tax. 
The subpart F rules limit the ability of businesses to 
shelter from U.S. taxation any passive income, including 
dividends from stock holdings. The separate limits on 
foreign tax credits for active and passive income reduce 
the impetus for corporations to use foreign tax credits 
related to active dividends that are subject to high foreign 
taxes as a way to shelter passive income associated with 
low-tax jurisdictions. 
Impact of Foreign Tax Credits and Deferrals on Federal 
Revenues. In 2008—the latest year for which detailed 
data are available—12 percent of federal revenues came 
from corporate income taxes, and about half of that 
amount was from multinational corporations claiming 
credits for taxes paid to foreign governments (see 
Table 5). Although those 7,242 companies represented 
only four-tenths of one percent of all U.S. corporations, 
they earned about 70 percent of total taxable corporate 
income. In all, U.S. multinational corporations claimed 
about $100 billion in foreign tax credits on almost 
$700 billion in worldwide taxable income (including 
domestic income and foreign income repatriated to the 
United States). The credits reduced those corporations’ 
income tax liability by about 40 percent.12 
Almost three-quarters of the foreign tax credits were 
claimed by corporations in the manufacturing sector, 
and those credits reduced their U.S. tax liability by 
55 percent. Total foreign repatriated income is almost 
60 percent of worldwide taxable income of the corpora-
tions claiming a foreign tax credit (comparing totals on 
Tables 5 and 6). About 10 percent of repatriated income 
came from the United Kingdom—a major U.S. trading 
partner (see Table 6)—and Canada accounted for 
another 8 percent. More than 9 percent was repatriated 
from countries often considered to be tax havens for 
U.S. corporate income because of their low tax rates: 
Bermuda, Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, and the 
Bahamas (see Box 1 on page 13). 
Measuring the impact of deferral is more challenging 
because multinational corporations are not required to 
report the amount of foreign income that is not 
repatriated.13 The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
Department of Commerce has reported that earnings of 
U.S. foreign affiliates were, on net, about $900 billion in 
2009 (that total does not include the foreign-branch 
10. Specifically, if a U.S. CFC purchased foreign property and sold it 
to another foreign subsidiary that was controlled by that CFC—a 
related party—that income would be deemed passive. 
11. 26 U.S.C. §951 et seq. (2006 & Supp.).
12. Some firms can take a deduction for foreign taxes in lieu of the 
credit. Such deductions are estimated to have resulted in forgone 
revenues of $0.2 billion in 2011 and are expected to reduce federal 
revenues by $1.2 billion over the 2011–2015 period. See Joint 
Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures 
for Fiscal Years 2011–2015, JCS-1-12 (January 17, 2012), 
http://go.usa.gov/flW.
13. Information is available from several sources. For example, data on 
foreign and domestic income are available from financial state-
ments and, with less detail, on the Internal Revenue Service’s 
Schedule M3; data on distributions from CFCs are available on 
the information returns of those corporations; and repatriated 
income is reported on the tax form that corporations use to claim 
foreign tax credits. Still, comparisons involving repatriated income 
are difficult because the available data sources measure income dif-
ferently and report income from different types of entities that are 
not easily linked.
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Table 5.
Use of the Foreign Tax Credit, by U.S. Industry, 2008
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Internal Revenue Service.
Note: * = less than $50 million.
a. Total income, consisting of domestic and repatriated foreign income that is subject to U.S. taxes.
b. The general business credit combines many of the available business credits, such as the research and development credit and investment 
credits. Combining the credits provides a uniform method for determining limits on their amounts.
c. Including additional credits that are not reported separately.
income of U.S. parent companies).14 Estimates of the cost 
of deferral use data on, or assumptions about, the distri-
bution of U.S. corporate income among countries with 
different tax rates and assumptions about how corpora-
tions might respond to changes in tax policy. Some ana-
lysts estimate, on the basis of a review of the financial 
data from 880 companies, that as of May 2011, unrepa-
triated foreign income totaled $1.4 trillion.15 JCT esti-
mates that forgone revenues attributable to deferral 
totaled about $16 billion in fiscal year 2012 and that they 
will amount to a total of $87 billion from 2011 through 
2015, making deferral of taxes on foreign income the 
largest corporate tax expenditure.16 
Effects of the Federal Tax Treatment of 
U.S. Multinational Corporations
The current U.S. tax treatment of multinational corpora-
tions affects their behavior in ways that have an impact 
on U.S. tax revenues: 
 The different treatment of foreign and domestic 
operations influences decisions about how much and 
where companies invest. Economic efficiency—the 
extent to which resources are allocated in a manner 
that maximizes their value—is reduced if firms forgo 
more productive investments because they are 
avoiding taxation. 
 The current U.S. tax code encourages firms to 
artificially shift reported income abroad and between 
foreign counties. 
 When firms choose to shift either their investments 
or their reported income abroad, U.S. revenues from 
corporate income taxes decline. 
Industry
Manufacturing 1,268 384.0 134.4 73.5 4.4 56.1
Services 2,600 68.2 23.9 7.3 2.1 14.3
Mining 109 38.7 13.6 6.8 * 6.5
Information 253 52.4 18.3 4.8 0.8 12.5
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and
Rental and Leasing 1,769 66.7 24.1 4.3 0.3 19.2
Wholesale and Retail Trade 570 73.1 25.6 2.9 0.6 22.0
Other 673 13.4 4.7 0.7 0.1 3.8_____ _____ _____ _____ ___ _____
Total 7,242 696.4 244.6 100.4 8.4 134.4
U.S.
After
Worldwide 
Before 
Income Tax Credits
Returns
Number of 
Incomea 
Taxable 
Credits
Income Tax 
Tax
Foreign General 
Creditsc
U.S.
Businessb
14. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Multinational 
Companies” (November 19, 2012), http://go.usa.gov/fTf. 
15. Dane Mott and Amy Schmidt, “Accounting Issues: Show Us the 
Foreign Cash!” North American Equity Research (September 12, 
2011). 
16. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax 
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2011–2015, JCS-1-12 (January 17, 
2012), http://go.usa.gov/flW. Tax expenditures are defined by the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws 
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from 
gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate 
of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Estimates of tax expenditures, 
unlike those for revenues, do not reflect any changes in taxpayers’ 
behavior in response to changes in the tax code.
12 OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS JANUARY 2013
CBO
Table 6.
Foreign Taxes Paid by and Foreign Taxable Income Repatriated to 
U.S. Parent Companies for Selected Countries, 2008
Source: Congressional Budget Office analysis of data on foreign tax credits from the Internal Revenue Service.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
a. The number of returns for each country is the number on which that country is listed; a single return filed by a U.S. parent company can 
list more than one country.
b. The total number of returns for all countries is the total filed by U.S. parent companies claiming a foreign tax credit.
Location of Investment 
The current U.S. tax system encourages firms to consider 
tax advantages as they choose whether to invest in the 
United States or in some foreign country: 
 The limit on foreign tax credits encourages 
corporations to avoid investing in countries where tax 
rates are higher than they are in the United States,
 The ability to defer foreign income encourages firms 
to invest and retain earnings in low-tax foreign 
jurisdictions rather than in the United States to avoid 
paying higher taxes here, and 
 The practice of cross crediting provides a further 
incentive for corporations to make foreign 
investments on the basis of their potential tax 
liabilities rather than their other business interests. 
A tax system that combines those three features yields a 
less efficient allocation of worldwide capital among 
domestic and foreign jurisdictions because companies can 
move capital from country to country in part to reduce 
their tax liabilities. Under the current U.S. tax system, a 
firm—faced with a choice between a project in the 
United States and a less productive investment in another 
country with lower taxes—might select the foreign 
investment because it yields a higher after-tax return.
The system also leads to an inefficient deployment of 
U.S. capital, thereby reducing the income of U.S. 
shareholders and employees. To the extent that firms are 
able to exploit market power (that is, to earn profits that
United Kingdom 1,142 10.3 39.3 9.5
Canada 2,430 11.0 32.8 7.9
Netherlands 709 7.8 21.5 5.2
Ireland 304 1.7 21.2 5.1
Switzerland 392 2.8 14.5 3.5
Japan 942 3.4 14.1 3.4
Bermuda 224 3.6 13.2 3.2
Luxembourg 202 2.6 10.9 2.6
Singapore 514 0.6 9.3 2.2
Cayman Islands (British) 227 1.3 8.8 2.1
Germany 645 2.1 8.7 2.1
China 590 1.1 8.0 1.9
France 638 2.4 7.5 1.8
Bahamas 116 2.1 6.3 1.5
Hong Kong 434 0.5 4.7 1.1
India 501 1.0 3.6 0.9
Italy 475 1.2 3.5 0.8
British Virgin Islands 82 0.2 1.1 0.3_____ ____ _____ ____
Total for Selected Countries n.a. 55.6 228.8 55.4
Memorandum:
Total for All Countriesb 7,242 121.2 413.3 100
Percentage of Total
Foreign Taxable Income Repatriated 
Returnsa (Billions of dollars)
Foreign Taxes Paid
(Billions of dollars)
Number of 
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are greater than the normal market return) in foreign 
jurisdictions, that profitability could benefit the U.S. 
economy. However, that benefit is unlikely to override 
the negative consequences (such as the loss of income to 
shareholders and employees) of inefficient allocation of 
U.S. capital.17 
Concerns about tax-motivated decisions by U.S. multi-
nationals to invest in foreign countries sometimes reflect 
the fear that the United States is losing jobs to other 
countries where tax rates are lower than they are here. 
However, the Congressional Budget Office anticipates 
that, apart from periods of general economic weakness—
like the recent severe recession and slow recovery—jobs 
lost in that way tend to be replaced by others, perhaps in 
other industries, in other locations, and at different 
wages. Specifically, a shift of investment by U.S. multi-
nationals to foreign markets can cause a loss of particular 
U.S. jobs (because a manufacturing plant is closed, for 
Box 1.
Tax Havens
The term tax haven is often applied to countries that 
do not assess income taxes or that appear to set taxes 
purposely low to attract investment or income from 
foreign businesses or individuals. More formal defini-
tions, however, have changed over time and vary 
among international organizations and governments. 
Factors other than tax rates are sometimes used to 
determine whether to call a particular country a tax 
haven. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), for example, originally iden-
tified countries as tax havens if they levied minimal 
taxes or none at all and if they prevented exchanges of 
information with foreign tax authorities, exhibited a 
lack of transparency, and did not require corporations 
to establish substantial local business activity. In 
2000, the OECD identified 35 such countries on the 
basis of those criteria.1 Since then, the OECD has 
classified countries on the basis of their commit-
ment—or lack of a commitment—to developing 
information exchanges with foreign tax authorities, 
and it assigns nations to what are known as the white, 
gray, and black lists. 
As of May 2012, the OECD had listed three coun-
tries that had not substantially implemented informa-
tion exchanges (Nauru, Niue, and Guatemala); none 
were black-listed as uncooperative tax havens. On the 
basis of its current criteria, the OECD does not des-
ignate as tax havens many countries that have low tax 
rates and that do not require corporations to have 
domestic business operations.
The Government Accountability Office has identi-
fied 50 countries as tax havens.2 That list includes 
countries that had been identified by the OECD in 
the past as tax havens and others that also have had 
low tax rates for businesses or that offer financial pri-
vacy and that, as a result, are considered tax havens by 
other sources.3 
1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report to the 2000 Ministe-
rial Council Meeting and Recommendations by the Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs, Progress in Identifying and Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices (2000), www.oecd.org/document/43/
0,3746,en_2649_33745_36153067_1_1_1_1,00.html.
2. Government Accountability Office, International Taxation: 
Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsid-
iaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy 
Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157 (December 2008), 
http://go.usa.gov/f1K.
3. See Dhammika Dharmapala and James R. Hines Jr., Which 
Countries Become Tax Havens? Working Paper 12802 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2006), 
www.nber.org/papers/w12802; and James R. Hines Jr. and 
Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and Ameri-
can Business, Working Paper 3477 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, April 1994), www.nber.org/papers/
w3477. Hines and Rice initially developed the criteria used 
by Dharmapala and Hines to identify 41 countries and 
territories as tax havens. 
17. In seeking to exploit market power, it is more likely that a corpo-
ration would use the many methods of manipulating returns on 
intangible assets, including licensing or franchising a brand name, 
that do not require a change in the location of an investment.
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example, or a new one is not built). But over the long 
term, the economy as a whole generates enough jobs to 
compensate for those losses. 
Still, the replacement jobs may be in different locations 
and for workers with different skills and experience. 
Moreover, unless that shift of investment is replaced by 
additional investment in the United States from other 
sources, less capital investment in this country will lead to 
lower overall wages and incomes for U.S. residents.
It bears emphasis that, although tax considerations mat-
ter, many other considerations, such as the quality of a 
country’s labor force and infrastructure, its regulatory 
environment, and its legal and political institutions, play 
a role in decisions about where to invest.
The incentives to invest abroad would be different under 
a worldwide tax system with unlimited foreign tax cred-
its: Firms would face the same tax rate regardless of where 
they invested because they would receive a credit for all 
taxes paid abroad whether or not those taxes exceeded the 
U.S. tax liability on that income. As a consequence, 
U.S. firms’ investments, or capital, would no longer be 
inefficiently allocated because of tax considerations.18 
Departures from that system yield different tax rates for 
different investment locations, and economic efficiency is 
reduced to the extent that companies attempt to respond 
to those different rates. 
Several researchers have tried to estimate how corporate 
taxes affect corporate investment behavior. One analysis 
showed that a 1 percentage-point increase in the U.S. tax 
rate relative to the tax rate in a foreign country increased 
U.S. multinational corporations’ employment and sales 
in that foreign country by 1.6 percent and 2.9 percent, 
respectively. However, both the assets and the gross 
income of U.S. corporations in that country increased 
even more, suggesting that firms respond to differences 
in tax rates by shifting reported profits as well as by 
relocating business activities.19 
Profit Shifting
Shifting investments to other countries can be quite 
costly, especially if the investment and the demand for 
skilled labor must be moved from a high-tax developed 
country to a low-tax jurisdiction that lacks an appropriate 
infrastructure or labor force and if goods that are 
produced abroad must be shipped to distant markets. 
Many of the tax advantages associated with relocating 
investment can be achieved—at a lower cost—by profit 
shifting, which allows businesses to maintain their actual 
investments in high-tax countries while reporting profits 
in low-tax jurisdictions.20 Some profit-shifting methods 
are controversial, and government tax administrators and 
corporations find themselves at odds over the legality 
of such financial transactions between U.S. parent 
corporations and their foreign subsidiaries. 
How do firms shift profits from one country to another? 
Some take advantage of the different tax treatment of 
entities and income in various jurisdictions, in some cases 
using rules that allow corporations to disregard, or ignore 
for tax purposes, income from certain subsidiaries. 
Another common way to reduce a company’s tax burden 
is for a business to take advantage of transfer pricing—
that is, how it sets prices on transfers of property, 
particularly intangible property (such as licenses to use 
intellectual property), among related businesses in 
different countries. 
Differing Treatment of Entities and Income. U.S. parent 
corporations can—for tax purposes—transform their for-
eign subsidiaries into hybrid entities that shelter income 
from U.S. and foreign taxes. In a standard hybrid struc-
ture, a subsidiary of a CFC is treated as a corporation by 
the foreign jurisdiction but as what is known as a pass-
through entity (for example, a branch of a CFC) under 
U.S. tax law. That arrangement allows the firm to take 
deductions in the foreign jurisdiction, but it also allows 
the income of the subsidiary to pass through to—that is, 
to be attributed to—the controlled foreign corporation. 
Thus, transactions between the two entities can be disre-
garded in calculating U.S. taxes, thereby avoiding U.S. 
taxes on such transactions. This feature of the U.S. tax 
system encourages companies to shift investments—and 
reported profits—abroad.
18. That efficiency also could be achieved if every country had the 
same territorial tax system and thus identical effective tax rates on 
all foreign investments. Allowing unlimited credits also would 
amount to a U.S. subsidy for foreign governments.
19. See Kimberly A. Clausing, “Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance 
and Tax Policy,” National Tax Journal, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 
2009), pp. 703–705. 
20. Profit shifting also imposes costs because it requires the use of 
resources for tax planning.
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Such an intercompany transaction occurs, for example, 
when a subsidiary that is incorporated in a low-tax 
jurisdiction lends money to a subsidiary incorporated in 
a high-tax jurisdiction, effectively shifting income to the 
low-tax country in the form of interest payments. The 
borrowing subsidiary deducts, at the high tax rate, 
the interest payments made to the lending subsidiary. For 
U.S. tax purposes, however, the borrowing subsidiary can 
be treated as a branch of the lending subsidiary, and the 
income of the borrowing subsidiary is considered 
the legal income of the lending subsidiary. Therefore, 
the parent corporation can shield the passive income (the 
interest the borrowing entity has paid to the lending 
entity) from the taxation that normally would occur 
under the U.S. system. By allowing the company to 
disregard, for tax purposes, the passive income of the 
hybrid entity in the year it is earned, the tax code effec-
tively defers the repatriation of the income and therefore 
the tax that will be owed on it. 
Under “check-the-box” rules, a business can elect to treat 
a subsidiary as a separate corporation, a partnership, or a 
“disregarded entity” that is not treated as separate from its 
owner.21 Those rules allow a corporation to remove a 
wholly owned subsidiary incorporated abroad from rec-
ognition by the U.S. tax system or to treat a partnership 
as a corporation for tax purposes. The rules were 
intended to simplify the classification of business entities 
by allowing multinational corporations to identify the 
status of an entity on its income tax forms.22 But the rules 
also enhance the ability of U.S. parent companies to 
make use of differences in tax laws to generate tax credits 
on unrepatriated income or to shield passive income from 
U.S. taxation.23 
A separate provision enacted in 2006 created the “look-
through” rule, which instituted specific classifications of 
certain types of intercompany payments of CFCs. The 
look-through rule allows those intercompany payments 
to escape taxation, permitting much of what check-the-
box rules also allow.24 The provision originally was 
scheduled to expire at the end of 2008 but was extended 
through 2013. If the look-through rule is extended again, 
eliminating the check-the-box rules would not be 
sufficient to restrict the use of hybrid entities to avoid 
U.S. taxes. 
Other features of the U.S. tax code also foster mis-
alignments between deductions and income. U.S. 
corporations can deduct interest expenses from taxable 
income, regardless of the expenses’ source. Therefore, a 
firm can claim the deduction for interest expenses related 
to foreign operations even if the income from those 
operations is never repatriated. That aspect of the U.S. 
tax code allows corporations to reduce the amount of 
income subject to U.S. taxation by deducting expenses 
for operations abroad without currently, or maybe ever, 
paying taxes on the income from those operations. This 
misalignment between deductions and taxation is attrib-
utable to the ability of firms to defer paying taxes on 
income earned abroad.
Transfer Pricing. U.S. firms also can shift income 
between countries through intercompany transfer 
pricing, a method of setting prices for the transfer of 
property, both real and intangible, between related par-
ties, such as from a parent corporation to a subsidiary. 
Under Treasury regulations, that price should be deter-
mined by the “arm’s length” standard—the price two 
unrelated parties would agree upon in the open market. 
However, for intellectual property of various kinds or 
for intangible assets, such as patents for production tech-
niques, it is difficult to determine what an open-market 
21. Most corporate filers do not actually check a box; the classification 
form includes some automatic classifications that depend on the 
number of owners and their liability status. For example, an entity 
is automatically disregarded for taxation if it has a single owner 
without limited liability, and it is classified as a partnership by 
default if it has multiple owners, at least one of which does not 
have limited liability. 
22. Although those rules were enacted to simplify the process of 
classifying and structuring business arrangements, any gain is 
diminished by the use of such complicated hybrid tax strategies 
as the “Double Irish” and “Dutch Sandwich” approaches. See 
Jesse Drucker, “Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion 
Lost to Tax Loopholes,” Bloomberg News (October 21, 2010), 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-
how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html. Some 
observers assert that check-the-box rules add complexity by 
encouraging corporations to compute taxes under different 
scenarios to determine which entity status will yield the smallest 
tax liability. See American Bar Association Tax Section, Task 
Force on International Tax Reform, “Report of the Task Force 
on International Tax Reform,” Tax Lawyer, vol. 59, no. 3 (2006), 
pp. 649–743.
23. Similarly, foreign parent corporations can use differences between 
U.S. tax laws and those of other countries to shield income from 
taxation at home.
24. For a comparison of check-the-box and look-through rules, see 
David R. Sicular, “The New Look-Through Rule: W(h)ither 
Subpart F?” Tax Notes (April 23, 2007), pp. 349–378. 
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price would be, and companies and tax authorities some-
times engage in costly disputes over the correct pricing. 
Companies have an incentive to underprice the transfer 
of assets to subsidiaries in low-tax countries and to over-
price sales from affiliates in low-tax countries to those in 
high-tax countries. 
A simple example of transfer pricing might involve a 
U.S. parent corporation’s sale or lease of patent rights on 
a production innovation to a foreign subsidiary located 
in a low-tax jurisdiction.25 Suppose the parent company 
developed the idea in the United States, where the 
research costs could be deducted from the company’s tax-
able income at the U.S. corporate income tax rate. Then, 
suppose the patent right is sold by the parent company to 
a subsidiary in a low-tax country. Thereafter, the income 
from sales of the resulting product (net of production 
costs) is allocated to the patent holder in the low-tax 
country, and if production costs are low, most of 
the receipts will be attributable to that subsidiary. If 
the transfer price for the patent right is set below the 
open-market price, the parent company benefits by 
reducing its reported income in the United States while 
allocating most of the income generated from use of the 
patent to the patent-holding subsidiary in the lower-tax 
country. By reinvesting earnings in the low-tax subsidiary 
and not repatriating that income to the United States, the 
company avoids paying U.S. taxes associated with the 
U.S. invention. 
Estimates of Profit Shifting. One study, noted earlier, 
showed that multinationals increased both real invest-
ment and reported profits in a country when its tax rate 
declined relative to the U.S. rate.26 The analysis showed 
that a 1 percentage-point increase in the U.S. tax rate rel-
ative to the tax rate in a foreign country can increase U.S. 
multinational corporations’ assets (including financial 
assets that may be unrelated to investment) and gross 
income (which are related to reported profits) in that 
country by 4.8 percent and 5.2 percent respectively, 
whereas employment and sales (which are indicators of 
real investments) in the host country increased much less. 
Those results suggest that profit shifting increases more 
than investment as a result of increases in the relative tax 
rate. 
Other studies present indirect evidence of profit shifting. 
Firms can relocate the legal home of their headquarters by 
merging with a foreign firm or by reincorporating 
abroad. If the firm relocates its legal headquarters to a 
low-tax jurisdiction, investments by the corporation are 
no longer subject to U.S. taxes even though the firm has 
made no changes to the location of capital. One report 
showed that an increase in the tax on repatriated income 
in the home country—assuming nothing else changes—
increases the likelihood that a corporation will legally 
relocate, suggesting that the prospect of paying more in 
taxes can encourage firms to use accounting or other 
methods to change the location of the profits they 
report.27
Some studies show that U.S. business income in low-tax 
countries is high relative to the actual presence of U.S. 
businesses in those countries.28 Other research has shown 
disproportionately large ratios of profits earned by U.S. 
firms relative to GDP in low-tax countries.29 Recent 
research has shown that firms’ shares of income abroad 
are increasing but that their share of sales is not.30 Those 
findings provide further evidence that firms are more 
likely to shift profits than to relocate investment in 
response to an increase in the U.S. tax rate relative to 
rates in other countries. 
Budgetary Effects of Decisions About 
Location and Profit Shifting
Both the movement of investment abroad and the 
shifting of reported profits reduce income subject to 
U.S. corporate taxes. Several researchers have attempted 
25. For a discussion of other ways to transfer income, see Joint 
Committee on Taxation, Present Law and Background Related to 
Possible Income Shifting and Transfer Pricing, JCX-37-10 (July 20, 
2010), http://go.usa.gov/fiw.
26. See Kimberly A. Clausing, “Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance 
and Tax Policy,” National Tax Journal, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 
2009), pp. 703–725.
27. Johannes Voget, Headquarter Relocations and International Taxa-
tion, Working Paper 1008 (Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation, April 2010).
28. Melissa Costa and Jennifer Gravelle, “U.S. Multinational Corpo-
rations: Effective Tax Rates and Business Locations,” in National 
Tax Association, Proceedings of the 103rd Annual Conference 
(Chicago, 2010), www.ntanet.org/publications/nta-proceedings/
222.html. 
29. Jane Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion, CRS Report for Congress R40623 (Congressional 
Research Service, September 3, 2010). 
30. Harry Grubert, “Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S. 
Multinational Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, are 
Being Globalized,” National Tax Journal, vol. 64, no. 2 (2012), 
pp. 247–281.
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to estimate how much tax revenue is lost to the U.S. 
Treasury through various accounting or other strategies 
that corporations use to reduce their tax liability on 
income earned from international transactions. The esti-
mates vary widely—from a low of $10 billion to a high of 
$90 billion per year. 
The difference in those estimates is partly the result 
of what type of avoidance is analyzed, but the choice of 
research methodology also affects the outcome.31 For 
example, some studies used data on differences in coun-
tries’ rates of returns, but that method accounts only for 
profit shifting by U.S. multinationals. In contrast, regres-
sion analyses that estimate profit shifting encompass 
shifts by foreign firms to the United States and by U.S. 
firms to foreign countries. Those studies yielded the 
highest estimates of revenue losses. Other studies assess 
the impact of policy changes on revenue losses, but their 
results apply only to the specific activity affected by that 
change. 
Policy Options
Among the avenues policymakers and analysts have 
suggested for changing—fundamentally or incremen-
tally—the way the U.S. tax code treats multinational 
corporations are the following: 
 Move significantly toward a purely worldwide system 
that limits or eliminates deferral,
 Move significantly toward a territorial system that 
exempts foreign income from domestic corporate 
taxation, or
 Prevent multinational corporations from avoiding 
taxes under the current system, for example, by 
restructuring the foreign tax credit or by treating 
entities and income consistently. 
This report discusses some policy options in each of 
those categories.32 Because the U.S. tax system affects 
multinationals’ decisions about where to invest and how 
to report profits, those choices have consequences for 
economic efficiency and U.S. tax revenues—key criteria 
for evaluating trade-offs between tax policy options. This 
assessment of each policy option considers its potential 
effects on the following: 
 Firms’ decisions about where to invest, 
 Firms’ decisions about shifting profits from one 
country to another, and 
 U.S. tax revenues.
Some options would dampen incentives to shift capital or 
profits abroad, thereby increasing economic efficiency 
and producing more tax revenue, others would bolster 
those incentives, and a third set could yield conflicting 
effects on efficiency and revenues (see Table 7). All of the 
options could be structured to boost U.S. corporate tax 
revenues, which could be used to reduce the deficit, pay 
for additional spending, finance reductions in corporate 
tax rates or other tax changes, or implement some combi-
nation of those actions. The economic and budgetary 
effects of the options would depend greatly on how they 
were structured. 
One important consideration in choosing among options 
involves firms’ responses to different tax rates. For exam-
ple, if multinational corporations are more likely to 
artificially shift reported profits than they are to adjust 
their investment behavior in response to lower tax rates 
abroad, options designed to limit such behavior may be 
preferable. Such options would restrict those corpora-
tions’ ability to use various accounting methods to avoid 
paying taxes, and they might or might not impede effi-
cient allocation of investments. Alternatively, if firms 
are more likely to adjust their investment behavior, tax 
31. See, for example, Kimberly A. Clausing, “The Revenue Effects of 
Multinational Firm Income Shifting,” Tax Notes (March 28, 
2011), pp. 1580–1586, and “Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance 
and Tax Policy,” National Tax Journal, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 
2009), pp. 703–725; Martin Sullivan, “U.S. Multinationals Shift-
ing Profits Out of the United States,” Tax Notes (March 10, 2008), 
pp. 1078–1082, and “Shifting Profits Offshore Costs U.S. Trea-
sury $10 Billion or More,” Tax Notes (September 27, 2004), 
pp. 1477–1481; and Charles W. Christian and Thomas D. 
Schultz, “ROA-Based Estimates of Income Shifting by U.S. 
Multinational Corporations,” in James Dalton and Beth Kilss, 
eds., IRS Research Bulletin: Recent Research on Tax Administration 
and Compliance—Proceedings of the 2005 IRS Research Conference, 
Publication 1500 (Washington, D.C., 2005), pp. 57–72, 
http://go.usa.gov/gP2R.
32. For estimates of the revenues that would accrue from adopting 
some of those options, see Joint Committee on Taxation, Esti-
mated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the Pres-
ident’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Proposal, JCX-27-12 (March 14, 
2012), http://go.usa.gov/gPrA; and Congressional Budget Office, 
Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options (March 2011). 
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Table 7.
Policy Options for the Tax Treatment of U.S. Multinational Corporations
Continued
policies that ensure economic efficiency could be more 
appropriate. However, it is difficult to distinguish 
between actual changes in investment behavior and those 
that are purely changes in accounting for profits. 
Although there is some evidence that firms’ investment 
decisions are affected by changes in the U.S. corporate tax 
rate, research findings suggest that firms respond more by 
artificially shifting their reported profits abroad. 
The options presented here specifically address the 
taxation of foreign income earned by multinational cor-
porations. Although this report does not discuss ways to 
change the treatment of U.S. corporations’ domestic 
Change in 
U.S. Tax Revenue, 
2012–2021
(Billions of dollars)
Effect on Decisions About:
Policy Description Investment Profit Shifting
Move More Toward a Worldwide Approach
Eliminate Deferral Subject all income earned 
by foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. corporations to U.S. 
taxes but maintain 
foreign tax credit
Would reduce investment 
in low-tax countries and 
could boost investment in 
high-tax countries
Would reduce shifting of 
income to low-tax 
countries
114
Eliminate Deferral For 
Certain Countries
Eliminate deferral of 
income from countries 
with low or no corporate 
income tax
Would reduce investment 
in those countries; some 
firms might shift 
investment to other 
countries for which 
deferral was still allowed
Would reduce shifting 
of income to those 
countries; some firms 
might shift income to 
other countries for which 
deferral was still allowed
Uncertain
Eliminate Deferral 
Related to Goods 
Produced Abroad
Eliminate deferral of 
income earned from the 
sale of certain goods 
produced abroad
Would reduce investment 
in the affected countries 
Would have little effect 
on profit shifting
Potentially a small 
increase
Move Toward a Territorial Approach
Exempt Active Dividends 
Earned Abroad from 
U.S. Taxation
Exempt dividend 
income earned from 
investments abroad from 
U.S. corporate taxes; 
eliminate deduction for 
overhead expenses 
allocated to foreign 
operations
Would increase 
incentives to invest in 
low-tax countries
Would increase 
incentives to shift income 
to low-tax countries; 
would create incentives 
to characterize payments 
from foreign subsidiaries 
as active dividends
76
Apportion U.S. and 
Foreign Income by 
Formula
Allocate total income 
among the United States 
and other countries on 
the basis of the fraction 
of assets, sales, 
employment, and payroll 
in each country
Would increase 
incentives to invest in 
low-tax countries; the 
effects might be small
Would reduce the 
incentive for firms to shift 
income
Probable increase
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Table 7. Continued
Policy Options for the Tax Treatment of U.S. Multinational Corporations
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
a. The projected change in U.S. tax revenues for this option is for fiscal years 2013 to 2022. It includes the effects of interactions with other 
proposals in the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget.
operations, the options presented could be combined 
with other, broader changes to the U.S. corporate tax 
system. For example, changes in the taxation of multi-
national firms could be combined with a reduction in 
the corporate tax rate. One proposal, presented in the 
2010 report of the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform (often called the Simpson–
Bowles commission), would combine a territorial tax 
system with a reduction of the top corporate tax rate from 
35 percent to a rate between 23 percent and 29 percent.33 
Although a territorial system would strengthen the incen-
tive for firms to move operations and reported income 
abroad, the reduction in the corporate tax rate could 
Change in 
U.S. Tax Revenue, 
2012–2021
(Billions of dollars)
Effect on Decisions About:
Policy Description Investment Profit Shifting
Restructure the Foreign Tax Credit
Determine Foreign Tax 
Credits on a Pooling 
Basis 
Base the total foreign tax 
credit on the share of 
aggregate earnings 
repatriated from each 
country
Would increase 
incentives to invest in 
low-tax countries, 
although with little effect
Would increase 
incentives to keep 
profits abroad to avoid 
U.S. taxes on income from 
subsidiaries in low-tax 
countries and would 
reduce shifting of income
57a
Determine Foreign 
Tax Credits with a 
Per-Country Limit
Disallow cross crediting 
by limiting the amount of 
foreign tax credits 
allowed from each 
country
Would increase 
incentives to invest in 
low-tax countries, 
although with little effect
Would increase shifting 
of income from high-tax 
to low-tax countries
Potentially small 
increase
Treat Entities and Income Consistently
Eliminate Check-the-Box 
Rules
Allow income from 
foreign entities to be 
untaxed only if the 
entity’s sole owner is 
legally organized or 
established within the 
same country
Would reduce incentives 
to invest abroad
Would reduce shifting of 
income from high-tax to 
low-tax countries 
Increase
Defer Interest 
Deductions Related to 
Deferred Income
Defer the deduction of 
interest expenses so that 
the share of total foreign 
expenses that is allowed 
to be deducted is the 
same as the ratio of 
repatriated income to 
total foreign income
Would indirectly increase 
incentives to invest 
abroad, although with 
little effect 
Would reduce shifting of 
income 
60a
33. See National Committee on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 
The Moment of Truth: Report of the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform (December 2010), http://go.usa.gov/
fO7. 
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offset those incentives and encourage firms to operate in 
and report their income in the United States. 
Other broad proposals involve combining reductions in 
the corporate tax rate with provisions that would move 
the tax system toward a more worldwide taxation struc-
ture. The President’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal, 
for example, called for reducing the top corporate tax rate 
from 35 percent to 28 percent and instituting a mini-
mum tax on income retained in low-tax countries.34 
Reducing the corporate tax rate could dampen the incen-
tive for multinational corporations to invest abroad or 
to change the location of reported income as a way to 
minimize their tax liability. However, as long as some 
countries have low corporate income tax rates or none at 
all, such incentives will never be completely overcome by 
reducing U.S. tax rates.
Move More Toward a Worldwide Approach
Because the U.S. tax system taxes income earned abroad, 
it leans toward a worldwide approach. However, deferral 
of taxes on unrepatriated foreign income gives the tax 
system some characteristics of a territorial approach. 
Options that would eliminate or reduce the ability of 
multinational corporations to defer taxes on foreign 
income would move the U.S. tax system closer to a purely 
worldwide system. Some options would prevent U.S. 
firms from deferring U.S. taxes on foreign income; all 
income earned by those businesses would be taxed as it is 
earned. Other options would maintain deferral but limit 
the types of income that could be deferred as a way to 
boost economic efficiency and increase revenues by 
removing incentives to shift income to low-tax jurisdic-
tions or to invest in low-tax jurisdictions solely to avoid 
paying U.S. taxes.35 
Eliminate Deferral. Under this option, all income earned 
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations—regardless 
of whether the income had been repatriated—would be 
subject to U.S. taxes. To prevent double taxation of for-
eign income, the foreign tax credit would remain in force, 
but, as under current law, that credit could not exceed the 
U.S. tax liability on foreign income. Because all income 
would be treated identically and taxed concurrently, how-
ever, the U.S. parent corporation’s overhead expenses 
would no longer be allocated between domestic and 
foreign activities for determining the foreign tax credit. 
Eliminating deferral would reduce the movement of capi-
tal and reported income to low-tax countries. Income 
earned abroad would generally be subject to the U.S. tax 
rate, thus reducing incentives to shift investment or 
reported income to countries with low taxes. With defer-
ral, firms have an incentive to bring back only as much 
income from low-tax countries as can be sheltered by the 
excess credits generated from paying taxes in high-tax 
countries. Without deferral, the tax advantage of retain-
ing income in a low-tax country would be diminished: 
All of a corporation’s income would now be taxed cur-
rently at U.S. rates. Removing that advantage would 
reduce tax-based motivations to retain income in low-tax 
countries and encourage companies to redirect those 
resources to more efficient uses.
Although this option generally would dampen the incen-
tive to shift investment and reported income to low-tax 
countries, in some circumstances, corporations might still 
find an advantage in doing so. Deferral might be elimi-
nated, but the rules governing foreign tax credits would 
not change and the amount of the credit would still be 
limited to the U.S. tax liability on income earned abroad; 
firms investing in countries with tax rates above those 
in the United States would still be able to use cross credit-
ing to avoid paying some tax. Thus, firms with excess 
foreign tax credits would still find it advantageous to shift 
investments or reported income from high-tax to low-tax 
countries. A variant of this option also would limit or 
eliminate cross crediting, further shrinking the incentive 
to shift investments to low-tax countries.
Revenue gains resulting from eliminating deferral 
might be diminished if, in response, corporations shifted 
investment or reported income from low-tax to high-tax 
countries. A business that had transferred its income to a 
low-tax country solely to cut its tax liability, for example, 
would no longer benefit from retaining income in the 
low-tax country and might shift that income back to one 
or more high-tax countries. Such a response could offset 
the revenue gains to the United States. However, if the 
option was paired with limits on cross crediting, the tax 
incentives to shift investments or income to high-tax 
countries would be reduced. 
34. See White House and Department of the Treasury, The 
President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform (February 2012), 
http://go.usa.gov/fOv. 
35. Eliminating deferral would remove the territorial features of the 
current tax system but would still not result in a purely worldwide 
tax system unless the limit on the foreign tax credit was eliminated 
as well. 
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Eliminating deferral also could increase the incentive cor-
porations have to incorporate, or register, abroad or to 
merge with overseas firms, thus reducing U.S. revenue 
gains in the future. However, the current tax system 
penalizes U.S. firms that “invert,” or reincorporate 
abroad. A more worldwide system could encourage 
emerging businesses to choose foreign incorporation 
without fear of inversion penalties. (Under the current 
system, there seems to be little evidence that fledgling 
firms choose to start up abroad.)36 
JCT estimates that eliminating deferral would raise, on 
net, about $50 billion between 2012 and 2016 and 
$114 billion over the 2012–2021 period.37 
Eliminate Deferral for Certain Countries. This option 
would eliminate deferral of income earned in countries 
that are considered tax havens, giving corporations less 
incentive to invest in or shift income to those countries 
because all of the resulting income would be subject to 
U.S. taxation as it was earned. Those firms would still 
have an incentive to shift investment or reported income 
to other low-tax countries that are not considered tax 
havens. The net effects on investment and income-
shifting are uncertain and have not been estimated.
The effect on U.S. tax revenues also is not clear; it would 
depend on how firms responded to the new incentives for 
investment and income shifting. If the shift was from 
countries considered tax havens to high-tax countries, tax 
revenues attributable to repatriation could drop as firms 
relied more on cross crediting. Alternatively, if investment 
or income was moved to other low-tax countries and 
repatriated, U.S. tax revenues could rise. 
Eliminate Deferral Related to Goods Produced Abroad. 
This option would eliminate deferral of income from the 
sale of goods produced abroad and imported to the 
United States, thus discouraging investment in foreign 
countries. The option would discourage the building 
of “runaway plants,” which corporations use to shift 
production abroad while they either import the goods to 
the United States or export them to another country. In 
the absence of enforceable rules for tracing the path of 
goods from production to final consumers, U.S. multi-
national corporations can currently adjust the reported 
location of their sales, which may or may not require 
physical transfer of goods, to take advantage of deferral. 
For example, a firm might transfer goods or ownership of 
products to another country so that they could be 
imported back to the United States and the income from 
that sale would be deferrable. Because this option would 
target sales of goods abroad rather than transfers of 
reported income, it probably would have little effect on 
the shifting of income to low-tax countries. 
To the extent that this type of option is enforceable, U.S. 
tax revenues would probably increase because the option 
would limit the amount of income corporations could 
defer. However, the revenue gains could be minimal if the 
affected goods were produced in high-tax countries, 
where U.S. corporations can take larger foreign tax 
credits. 
Move Toward a Territorial Approach
The United States could move formally toward a territo-
rial system of taxation in any of several ways, one of 
which would be to exempt some or all income earned 
abroad from the U.S. corporate income tax.38 Under one 
option, dividend income from investments abroad would 
be excluded from the U.S. tax base; in that case, by set-
ting those dividends, multinational corporations would 
determine the amount of income earned abroad that 
would be excluded. Another option would require firms 
to use a formula, set by law, to distinguish foreign from 
domestic income. A formula approach is not necessarily 
limited to a purely territorial system; it could also be 
applied to a tax system, like the current one in the United 
States, that leans toward a worldwide system but has 
deferral.
Exempt Active Dividends Earned Abroad from U.S. 
Taxation. Exempting active foreign dividends from 
U.S. taxation would move the country toward a 
36. See Eric J. Allen and Susan C. Morse, “Firm Incorporation Out-
side the U.S.: No Exodus Yet” (unpublished paper, University of 
California, Hastings College of Law, October 2011), 
www.works.bepress.com/susanmorse/10.
37. That estimate differs from the tax expenditure for deferral because 
of adjustments made to account for firms’ behavioral responses 
(for example, choosing to restructure in favor of foreign branches 
rather than subsidiaries) in the estimates for policy options. See 
Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and 
Revenue Options (March 2011), p. 186. 
38. For a comparison of options to eliminate deferral and exempt 
dividends, see Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, “Corporate 
Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-
Border Income,” in John W. Diamond and George R. Zodrow, 
eds., Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications 
(MIT Press, 2008).
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territorial tax system; active dividends from investments 
abroad would not be subject to domestic corporate taxes. 
All other forms of foreign income, including royalties, 
interest payments, and income from passive activities, 
would be taxed as they are under current law—as the 
income is earned.39 Under this option, overhead expenses 
that are allocated to foreign operations (such as interest 
expenses generated by foreign subsidiaries’ borrowing) 
would no longer be deductible because the income associ-
ated with those expenses would never be subject to 
U.S. taxation. 
Exempting active foreign dividends would tend to 
increase investment in and reported income from low-tax 
countries. The option would make investment behavior 
by U.S. firms less efficient by increasing incentives to 
invest in low-tax countries.40 Without a tax on repatriated 
dividends, U.S. multinational corporations would prefer 
to locate as much income as possible in the lowest-tax 
countries and would have more incentive to shift their 
reported income to such countries. Additionally, firms 
would have an incentive to characterize payments from 
foreign subsidiaries as active dividends because they 
would be exempt from U.S. taxation. 
In general, countries with territorial (or exemption) tax 
systems collect less revenue, all else being equal, than they 
would with worldwide tax systems.41 However, for two 
reasons, this option could raise revenues, despite the 
exemption of foreign dividends from taxable income: 
The option would restrict the ability of firms to deduct 
expenses associated with foreign operations, and it would 
more effectively tax income from royalties.42 Other meth-
ods of exempting dividends could result in revenue losses.
All expenses now are deductible regardless of their source. 
Under this option, overhead expenses allocated to foreign 
operations would no longer be deductible and a corpora-
tion’s taxable income would, according to JCT, increase 
enough to more than offset the Treasury’s loss from not 
taxing active foreign income. If firms were allowed to 
continue to deduct all overhead expenses, including those 
associated with foreign operations, this option would 
probably result in a significant revenue loss.
This option also could result in added federal tax reve-
nues because receipts from taxes on royalty income would 
probably rise once dividends were exempted. Current law 
subjects income from royalties to U.S. taxation. However, 
firms are able to use excess foreign tax credits generated 
by dividends from high-tax countries to cross credit 
against U.S. taxes on royalty income, allowing much of 
that income to escape U.S. taxation. Under this option, 
those dividends—once exempted from U.S. taxation—
could not be used to generate excess foreign tax credits, 
thus increasing the likelihood that royalty income would 
become taxable.43 
JCT has estimated that this option would increase reve-
nues by about $32 billion from 2012 through 2016 and 
by $76 billion from 2012 through 2021.44 
Apportion U.S. and Foreign Income by Formula. Another 
path to a territorial-type system would be to institute 
what is known as formula apportionment. Some observ-
ers consider this approach a simpler alternative to the 
current transfer-pricing rules, which require arm’s-length 
pricing that is difficult to enforce. Under formula appor-
tionment, before-tax income would be allocated to the 
United States and other countries according to a formula 
that accounted for the fraction of assets, sales, employ-
ment, and payroll a corporation had in each country, 
rather than relying on the taxpayer’s reports of their 
income reflecting the transfer prices it had set.45 The 
39. Unlike dividends, other types of active income (such as interest 
payments, fees, or royalties) are taxed when they are earned 
because they flow directly to the parent company. All passive 
income is taxed as it is earned under subpart F of the Internal 
Revenue Code.
40. There could be efficiency gains for the U.S. economy to the extent 
that the overall tax on capital was reduced. Determining the net 
effect is difficult and depends on the details of the option. 
41. Territorial approaches are sometimes referred to as exemption 
systems because they exempt, subject to anti-abuse rules, foreign 
income from taxation.
42. Kimberly A. Clausing, “Corporate Tax Revenues in OECD 
Countries,” International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 14, no. 2 
(April 2007), pp. 115–133.
43. For discussion of the effects of exempting dividends, see Rosanne 
Altshuler and Harry Grubert, “Where Will They Go If We Go 
Territorial: Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of 
U.S. Multinational Corporations,” National Tax Journal, vol. 54, 
no. 3 (December 2001), pp. 787–809; and Harry Grubert, 
“Enacting Dividend Exemption and Tax Revenue,” National Tax 
Journal, vol. 54, no. 3 (December 2011), pp. 811–827. 
44. Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and 
Revenue Options (March 2010), pp. 187–188.
45. Net income, rather than gross income, would be allocated, 
causing the deductions for expenses also to be allocated propor-
tionately to foreign income. As a result, deductions against foreign 
income would be higher than they are under the current system.
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income allocated to the United States would then be 
subject to U.S. taxation. 
Another type of formula apportionment would separately 
address the allocation of income from intangible assets, 
such as patents and trademarks, because that allocation is 
not readily observable. Such an approach would assign 
normal returns from an investment—that is, the return 
that would be expected to cover the cost of investment—
to the country where the costs of producing the income 
are incurred and assign any remaining income (the 
income from intangible assets) on the basis of where the 
products are sold.46
With allocation on the basis of a formula, there would be 
fewer disputes between the tax authorities and taxpayers 
regarding the amounts that are reported as income. The 
formula would be statutory and based on actual business 
activity, so U.S. firms would find it more difficult to 
avoid taxes by moving reported income abroad. But 
because they would still have an incentive to locate real 
investment in countries with lower tax rates, this option 
would not reduce inefficiencies from decisions about 
where to locate investments. 
In the United States, some states have already adopted 
formulas that determine taxable corporate income by the 
fraction of the corporation’s sales, employment, or physi-
cal assets (or some weighted combination of each factor) 
within the state.47 The European Union has proposed a 
similar form of formula apportionment under which 
taxable income would be determined using a weighted 
fraction of the share of sales, payroll, employment, and 
assets in a given country.48 
Some important practical considerations could hamper 
the adoption of an apportionment system, however. 
For example, other countries might retaliate if the 
United States were to implement such a system without 
renegotiating its tax treaties and trade agreements.49 
Such concerns have led the European Union to limit its 
proposal for formula apportionment to its member 
countries.
Moreover, formula apportionment imposes an implicit 
tax on each factor used in the formula, which could 
reduce investment by discouraging companies from hir-
ing workers or accumulating assets in high-tax countries 
(including the United States). As a result, those firms 
might shift their investments to low-tax countries, thus 
reducing U.S. tax revenues and increasing inefficiency. In 
addition, without coordination between countries, under 
this option some income could be taxed twice: Income 
would be treated as though derived from domestic 
sources and taxed in the United States, even though it 
was earned abroad and might be taxed by the host 
country as well. 
Possible inefficiencies stemming from multinationals’ 
incentives under the formula to change the location of 
investments would be mitigated by other factors that—
both under current law and under the option—restrict 
movement in real activity. For example, firms might find 
it costly to transport materials or could find themselves 
constrained by the need to locate in a country where 
demand for their goods or services is high. Because capi-
tal is more mobile than customers, a formula that gave 
greater weight to the fraction of sales in a given country 
also would reduce the incentive to move production to a 
country that did not have a significant consumer market 
for the product. 
This option would generally make it more difficult to 
shift reported income abroad because income would be 
allocated on the basis of relatively immobile factors, such 
as employment and sales. However, corporations could 
still take steps to minimize their taxes, especially if 
income was assigned in part according to the location of 
assets. For example, financial assets are relatively mobile 
and could be moved by firms trying to reduce their tax 
liability. The alternative approach, with separate alloca-
tions for income and intangible assets, would further 
46. For discussion of this approach, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Kimberly A. Clausing, and Michael C. Durst, “Allocating Busi-
ness Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary 
Profit Split,” Florida Tax Review, vol. 9, no. 5 (2009), pp. 497–
553. 
47. See Federation of Tax Administrators, “State Apportionment of 
Corporate Income” (May 2012), www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/
tax_stru.html. 
48. For a discussion of the consequences of such a change, see Michael 
Devereux and Simon Loretz, The Effects of EU Formula Apportion-
ment on Corporate Tax Revenues, Working Paper WP 07/06 
(Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, April 2007), 
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/papers/Pages/paperWP0706.aspx. 
49. For a discussion of the complexity of implementing formula 
apportionment, see Joanne Martens Weiner, Formulary Apportion-
ment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada, Taxation Papers, Working Paper 8 
(European Commission, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation
_customs/common/publications/services_papers/working
_papers/index_en.htm.
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constrain income shifting by allocating income on the 
basis of production costs and sales and reducing corpora-
tions’ ability to strategically locate expenses and income 
in different countries.
By using measures of actual business activity to allocate 
income between domestic and foreign sources instead of 
allowing firms to identify sources of income, this option 
would probably increase U.S. tax revenues. Because 
it would primarily impede corporations’ efforts to shift 
reported profits as a way to avoid U.S. taxation, however, 
firms might respond by shifting their investments to low-
tax countries, and the revenue gains from the option 
would be reduced. 
Other Options
Two other types of options would address tax avoidance 
as it is permitted under the current system: restructuring 
the foreign tax credit and providing a system of more 
consistent treatment of various entities and income. 
Restructure the Foreign Tax Credit. Although oppor-
tunities for cross crediting are limited because statutory 
corporate tax rates are generally higher in the United 
States than they are in other countries, some researchers 
still report significant use of cross crediting by U.S. 
multinational corporations.50 Those results suggest that 
effective corporate tax rates, which reflect both the statu-
tory rates and other features of the tax system, are lower 
in the United States than in some other countries (see the 
appendix for a discussion of effective rates). 
Concern over corporations’ use of excess foreign tax cred-
its to offset tax liabilities in low-tax countries has led to 
suggestions that the foreign tax credit should be restruc-
tured. Under one option, credits would be determined by 
“pooling”—limiting the total foreign tax credit according 
to the share of a firm’s total foreign income that is repatri-
ated to the U.S. parent company. Another option would 
limit the foreign tax credit that a corporation could claim 
for every country separately. Both options would affect 
repatriation of income by corporations that amass an 
excess of credits to shield repatriated income from taxa-
tion in the United States. The effects of such provisions 
on U.S. tax revenues would depend on firms’ ability to 
adjust their repatriations or allocations of worldwide 
income. If modifications to the foreign tax credit were 
paired with an option that substantially reduced deferral 
or eliminated it altogether, those companies would be 
more likely to repatriate income, thus increasing U.S. tax 
receipts. 
Determine Credits on a Pooling Basis. Under this option, 
foreign tax credits would be determined by pooling the 
firm’s earnings from all foreign countries, and the total 
credit would be set according to the percentage of those 
aggregate earnings that are repatriated. 
In general, the option would reduce the foreign tax 
credit. As an example, consider a multinational corpora-
tion with gross earnings of $100 million from each of two 
subsidiaries—one in a country with a corporate tax rate 
of 12.5 percent and one in a country with a 40 percent 
tax rate (see Table 8). The firm pays a total of $52.5 mil-
lion in foreign taxes. Suppose it repatriates all of its net 
earnings—$60 million—from the subsidiary in the 
high-tax country ($100 million in dividends minus the 
$40 million paid in taxes) but only $19.5 million from 
the subsidiary in the low-tax country ($22.3 million in 
dividends minus $2.8 million in taxes). In total, the firm 
pays $42.8 million in foreign taxes on the income repatri-
ated to the United States. The foreign tax credit on the 
repatriated income also is $42.8 million—the top U.S. 
corporate rate of 35 percent applied to the repatriated 
gross income (that is, the income repatriated to the 
United States, including the foreign taxes that have been 
paid on that income, or $122.3 million). Thus, under 
current law the firm can take foreign tax credits equal to 
82 percent of the total foreign taxes it paid ($42.8 million 
divided by $52.5 million). Under this scenario, the par-
ent company has repatriated enough income from the 
subsidiary in the low-tax country to use up the excess 
credits from the subsidiary in the high-tax country. 
Under the option, credits would be assigned according to 
the amount of pooled foreign income, and the computa-
tion of foreign taxes paid would differ from that under 
current law in two key regards. First, the computation 
would start with the total amount of taxes paid to foreign 
entities ($52.5 million, in the example). Then, that total 
would be allocated among countries based on the share of 
total before-tax foreign earnings repatriated from each 
country. 
50. Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, “Corporate Taxes in a 
World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border 
Income,” in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., 
Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications 
(MIT Press, 2008).
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Table 8.
Example of Pooling to Determine Credits
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Amount is the average tax rate across the two countries.
b. Repatriated income is “grossed up” to include the amount of taxes paid on that income to the foreign country; the value of the repatriated 
income is divided by one minus the tax rate of the country from which the income is repatriated.
c. Per-country credits are shown for illustration only and are not calculated separately for U.S. tax purposes.
d. Amount is the difference between grossed-up dividends and repatriated dividends.
e. Amount is the product of total foreign taxes paid in both countries and grossed-up dividends in a particular country as a percentage of 
before-tax earnings in both countries.
In the example, the subsidiary in the low-tax country 
repatriated about 11 percent of the $200 million that the 
corporation earned through its operations in both foreign 
countries, and the subsidiary in the high-tax country 
repatriated 50 percent. The share of foreign taxes attrib-
uted to the low-tax subsidiary would be $5.9 million 
(11 percent of $52.5 million) and the share attributed 
to the high-tax subsidiary would be $26.3 million 
(50 percent of $52.5 million). The total would be 
$32.1 million and, under the pooling option, the foreign 
tax credit also would be $32.1 million. Thus, under the 
pooling option, the firm can take foreign tax credits only 
to the extent that those credits equal 61 percent of foreign 
taxes. 
The foreign tax credit is smaller under the pooling 
option—in this example, it is reduced by $10.7 mil-
lion—because the firm repatriated just 61 percent of its 
foreign income, and the credit would be limited to that 
share of the total foreign taxes the firm had paid. Under 
current law, the firm can claim a credit for more foreign 
taxes by repatriating more from high-tax countries than 
from low-tax countries. The pooling provision would 
reduce the amount of the credit because it would require 
a shared allocation. 
The net effect on corporations’ investment is not clear 
but probably would be small. Limiting the ability to cross 
credit could shift investment from high-tax to low-tax 
countries because corporations would not benefit as 
Before-Tax Earnings 100.0 100.0 200.0
Foreign Tax Rate (Percent) 12.5 40.0 26.3 a
Foreign Taxes Paid on All Earnings 12.5 40.0 52.5
Repatriated Income 19.5 60.0 79.5
Repatriated Income Before Foreign Taxes 
Millions of dollarsb 22.3 100.0 122.3
As a percentage of total before-tax 
earnings in both countries 11.1 50.0 61.1
 
U.S. Taxes Before Foreign Tax Credit 7.8 35.0 42.8
Foreign Taxes Paid on Repatriated Incomed 2.8 40.0 42.8
Foreign Tax Credit with Cross Crediting 7.8 35.0 42.8
U.S. Taxes After Foreign Tax Credit 0 0 0
U.S. Taxes Before Foreign Tax Credit 7.8 35.0 42.8
Foreign Taxes Deemed Paid on Repatriated Incomee 5.9 26.3 32.1
Foreign Tax Credit 5.9 26.3 32.1
U.S. Taxes After Foreign Tax Credit 1.9 8.7 10.7
Low-Tax Country High-Tax Country Total
Taxes Under Current Lawc
Taxes Under a Pooling Option
Foreign Income
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much from the larger tax credits. Firms also might 
respond to the higher taxes on repatriated income by 
increasing investment abroad and retaining more of the 
resulting earnings. The effects probably would be small, 
however, because the additional tax benefits would be 
insufficient to compensate for the barriers to moving 
investments abroad. 
Nevertheless, determining foreign tax credits by pooling 
would have implications for the way firms allocate their 
income. As the example above shows, this option would 
restrict firms’ ability to use excess credits from countries 
with high taxes to offset the U.S. corporate tax on income 
from countries with low taxes. It would thereby reduce 
the incentive to shift reported profits strategically 
between high-tax and low-tax countries to take advantage 
of cross crediting and deferral. 
Some income from subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions 
would be taxed at a substantially higher rate under the 
option than would be the case under current law. (In this 
example, the firm would pay the $40 million in taxes to 
the high-tax country, both under current law and with 
pooling, but the pooling option would require the firm 
to pay U.S. tax of $8.7 million in excess of the allowable 
foreign tax credit). That effect would be mitigated 
somewhat by the higher foreign tax credit imputed to 
the income repatriated from the lower-tax country 
($5.9 million, compared with $2.8 million permitted 
under current law). 
Corporations generally would no longer have an incen-
tive to strategically choose individual subsidiaries from 
which to repatriate income because taxes would be pro-
portionately assigned to each country and would not be 
linked to the individual subsidiary. In general, however, 
firms would still have an incentive to keep profits abroad 
to avoid paying U.S. taxes on income from subsidiaries in 
low-tax jurisdictions. Indeed, that incentive would be 
stronger because of the decline in the potential value of 
the foreign tax credit. 
JCT estimates that adopting this option (the same as that 
proposed in the President’s 2013 budget) would increase 
revenue by $25 billion between fiscal years 2013 and 
2017 and by $57 billion between fiscal years 2013 and 
2022.51
Determine Credits with a Per-Country Limit. Another 
option would disallow cross crediting by limiting the 
amount of credits allowed from each country. By requir-
ing firms to compute a separate foreign tax credit for 
income earned in each country, a per-country limit, like 
that in effect in the United States between 1932 and 
1976, would prevent firms from using repatriated income 
from a high-tax country to shield income from a low-tax 
country. 
By eliminating the ability of firms to cross credit by com-
bining the income from high-tax and low-tax countries, 
this option would bolster the incentive to reinvest income 
in low-tax countries rather than repatriate it. Firms also 
would have an incentive to shift income from high-tax 
to low-tax countries. However, to the extent that income 
in low-tax countries is derived from passive activities, 
those firms could no longer shield the income from U.S. 
taxation through the use of excess foreign tax credits. It is 
not clear whether net repatriated income would decline as 
a result, but if repatriation responses were small, U.S. tax 
revenues would increase. 
A disadvantage of the option is its complexity. Firms 
would have to report the sources of income and calculate 
credits separately for each country instead of combining 
income from all countries under an aggregate credit as 
they do under current law. Large multinational cor-
porations with multiple tiers of subsidiaries in different 
countries would face an especially large additional filing 
burden. 
Treat Entities and Income Consistently. Another 
approach would be to incrementally change the taxation 
of U.S. multinational corporations by treating different 
forms of business entities and income more consistently 
than current law does. One option would repeal the 
check-the-box rules that allow U.S. multinationals to 
treat subsidiaries differently for U.S. tax purposes than 
they are treated by foreign jurisdictions. Another would 
preclude U.S. corporations from claiming interest deduc-
tions related to foreign income that stays abroad and out 
of reach of U.S. taxation. Both options generally would 
increase U.S. tax revenues because they would constrain 
the ability of firms to shift reported income from the 
United States to low-tax countries. However, they also 
could reduce economic efficiency if corporations
51. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Reve-
nue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget 
Proposal, JCX-27-12 (March 14, 2012), http://go.usa.gov/gPrA. 
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Figure 1.
Effect of Check-the-Box Rules Under Current Law and If Eliminated
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
responded by moving their investments to low-tax 
countries.
Eliminate Check-the-Box Rules. U.S. parent corporations 
currently can choose to shield the passive income of cer-
tain solely owned foreign subsidiaries from U.S. taxation 
by checking a box on their tax returns. (Under normal 
circumstances, the income would be subject to U.S. 
taxation under the subpart F rules that govern passive 
income.) Check-the-box rules allow multinational corpo-
rations to create and use hybrid business entities, which 
are treated differently by foreign tax authorities than they 
are by the United States. In a simple case, a parent com-
pany owns a Subsidiary A, which it has incorporated in a 
high-tax country. Subsidiary A wholly owns Subsidiary B, 
which is located in a low-tax country (see Figure 1). 
Subsidiary A borrows $100 million from Subsidiary B, 
and because Subsidiary B is a separate corporation, 
Subsidiary A is allowed to deduct its interest payments 
on the loan from its income on its tax return in the 
high-tax country. But Subsidiary B is treated as a 
branch of Subsidiary A for U.S. tax purposes under the 
check-the-box rules, and the U.S. tax code considers the 
income received by a branch (B, in this example) to be 
the legal income of the parent (A, in this example). Thus, 
under U.S. tax law, the interest payment, in effect, is 
treated as an internal transaction within Subsidiary A. As 
a result, the interest income received by Subsidiary B 
escapes U.S. taxation.
Those rules facilitate shifting income from high-tax 
countries to low-tax countries by multinational corpora-
tions and encourage firms to shift investment and 
reported profits abroad to avoid paying U.S. taxes. 
By making interest payments to subsidiaries in low-
tax countries and deducting those payments in high-tax 
countries, the firms effectively shift that income from 
subsidiaries in high-tax countries to subsidiaries in low-
tax countries. Furthermore, those payments, which 
would be considered passive income and subject to U.S. 
taxation, are shielded from U.S. taxes by the check-box-
rule that allows Subsidiary B to be treated as part of 
Subsidiary A. As a result, the interest payments are not 
considered income under current U.S. tax law.
Current Check-the-Box Rules Elimination of Check-the-Box Rules
U.S. parent corporation chooses to treat
Subsidiary B as a branch of Subsidiary A
U.S. parent corporation must treat
Subsidiary B as a separate incorporated entity
Subsidiary A
U.S. Parent Corporation
Subsidiary B
Subsidiary B’s
interest income 
is not subject to 
U.S. taxation as 
passive income
of the U.S. parent
corporation
U.S
TAX
RETURNX Owns Subsidiary ALocated in high-tax country
Owns Subsidiary B
Pays interest income to Subsidiary B
Located in low-tax country
Deducts
interest
income on
tax return of
high-tax
country
U.S
TAX
RETURN
Subsidiary B’s
interest income 
is subject to 
U.S. taxation as
passive income
of the U.S. parent
corporation
?
Interest
Interest
Subsidiary B
Located in low-tax country
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This option would require that income from foreign enti-
ties be excluded from taxable income only if that entity’s 
sole owner is legally organized or established within the 
same country. That restriction would constrain U.S. par-
ent corporations’ ability to shift income from high-tax to 
low-tax countries through payments of passive income 
that currently escape taxation under subpart F. Passive 
income payments made between two entities could still 
be excluded from taxable income as long as both were in 
the same country.
The advantages of investing abroad would decline under 
this option because firms would lose the ability to shield 
certain income from those investments. There would be 
no advantage to shifting income because payments would 
be taxed at the same time and at the same rates as the 
corresponding deductions. Moreover, U.S. tax revenues 
would increase because passive income from solely owned 
subsidiaries would not be shielded from U.S. taxation. 
(However, if the look-through rule provision was 
extended beyond 2013, eliminating check-the-box rules 
would not prevent firms from shielding intercompany 
payments from U.S. taxation.)
Defer Interest Deductions Related to Deferred Income. U.S. 
multinational corporations can deduct interest expenses 
from their taxable income. Those expenses are not allo-
cated between foreign and U.S. sources for purposes of 
determining deductions against gross income that is sub-
ject to U.S. taxation. However, for determining the limit 
on the foreign tax credit, interest expenses are allocated to 
foreign and domestic sources in proportion to the ratio of 
foreign assets to total assets. 
This option would defer the deduction of interest 
expenses allocated to foreign income that is not currently 
subject to U.S. taxation. The proportion of all foreign-
related deductions allowed would be the same as the ratio 
of taxable foreign income to total foreign income. The 
foreign tax credit would still be determined by allocating 
all expenses according to the share of a company’s total 
assets in each country. 
In general, requiring interest deductions to be deferred 
until the associated income is repatriated would provide 
an incentive for corporations to accelerate repatriation. 
Still, increased repatriation could come from countries 
with higher taxes, and firms could still use cross crediting 
to shield income repatriated from low-tax countries 
under this option. 
By making it more costly for corporations to shift income 
abroad, this option might cause firms to respond by 
adjusting their investments to avoid an increase in tax lia-
bility. Nevertheless, the targeted nature of this option 
would probably produce little change in investment. The 
incentives to shift income would decline, because firms 
could no longer immediately claim deductions for 
expenses associated with foreign operations when taxes 
on the income earned from those activities was deferred. 
JCT estimates that adopting this option (which was 
proposed in the President’s 2013 budget) would increase 
revenue by $28 billion between fiscal years 2013 and 
2017 and by $60 billion between fiscal years 2013 
and 2022.52
52. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Reve-
nue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget 
Proposal, JCX-27-12 (March 14, 2012), http://go.usa.gov/gPrA.
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Appendix: 
Corporate Tax Rates
Corporate income tax rates are specified by the tax 
code. However, the actual tax rates that a firm faces differ 
from the rates in the tax code—the statutory tax rate—
because of other provisions in the code that affect its tax 
liability. Both the statutory rates and those that the firm 
actually pays can be compared among countries to ana-
lyze the tax burdens firms face in different countries. 
Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates
Most developed countries—including all members of the 
Organisation for European Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD)—tax corporate income, typically at the 
national and the subnational (state or province, for exam-
ple) levels. Statutory tax rates on corporate income differ 
from one country to another. In 2011, the top rates 
among the 34 members of the OECD ranged from 
12.5 percent in Ireland to 39.5 percent in Japan (see 
Figure A-1). Those rates combined the top national stat-
utory corporate tax rate—that is, the tax rate that applies 
to income in the highest tax bracket—in each country 
with the average corporate tax rate set at the subnational 
level of government.1 In 2011, the top U.S. federal 
statutory rate on business income that was subject to the 
corporate income tax was 35 percent, and the average top 
statutory rate imposed on that income by states was 
about 6 percent—for a combined top statutory rate of 
39.1 percent (after accounting for the fact that state taxes 
are deductible from federal taxable income).
Weighted by gross domestic product, the average com-
bined tax rate for current OECD countries, excluding the 
United States, was 19.1 percent in 2011. (That average 
probably declined in 2012 because Japan cut its top cor-
porate tax rate—at the national level—in April from 
30 percent to 25.5 percent, making the statutory U.S. tax 
rate the highest among OECD member countries.)2 
Although the majority of OECD countries have a top 
corporate tax rate of at least 25 percent, some countries 
have rates that are so low (sometimes zero) that they are 
considered tax havens, attracting both investment by and 
reported income from multinational corporations (see 
Box 1 on page 13). 
Average Tax Rates
Statutory rates may not represent the tax rate that multi-
national corporations actually face. Because of the 
graduated rate structure, deductions, credits, and other 
business tax provisions (such as favorable depreciation 
allowances and credits for certain activities), the average 
tax rates that corporations pay—the ratio of total taxes to 
aggregate income—are generally below the top statutory 
rates. For example, the average rate faced by U.S. domes-
tic firms with no foreign operations between 2005 and 
2009 was about 10 percentage points lower than the 
statutory rate. 3 
1. For each country in which subnational corporate taxes are 
deductible from national taxes, as in the United States, the com-
bined statutory tax rate is the sum of the national and subnational 
tax rates minus the product of the national and subnational 
statutory rates, which amounts to the value of the deduction. 
2. Japan added a 10 percent surtax for three years, raising the rate to 
28.01 percent (excluding local taxes).
3. For a comparison of the average U.S. tax rate with that of selected 
other countries, including major trading partners, see Kevin 
Markle and Douglas Shackelford, Cross Country Comparisons of 
Corporate Income Taxes, Working Paper 16839 (National Bureau 
of Economic Research, February 2011) www.nber.org/papers/
w16839. 
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Figure A-1.
Combined Corporate Income Tax Rate of OECD Countries, 2011
(Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Note: The combined corporate income tax rate is the rate charged at the national and subnational (state or province, for example) levels.
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Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Another way to compare corporate tax rates among 
countries is to look at the effective marginal corporate tax 
rate—the rate of tax paid on an additional dollar of 
income. Like average tax rates, effective marginal tax rates 
take into account tax preferences as well as the statutory 
tax rate. 
Corporations generally consider their marginal tax rates 
when they assess whether to make additional investments 
in ongoing projects. In contrast, average tax rates are 
more relevant when considering substantial investments, 
such as those required for building manufacturing plants 
abroad. As a result, average tax rates could carry more 
weight than marginal rates do in the calculations that 
determine whether a company will make a large new 
investment in a particular country. 
Effective marginal tax rates depend on several factors, but 
two in particular—the treatment of depreciation and the 
treatment of financing—largely determine the differences 
between statutory rates and effective marginal tax rates. 
Consequently, an important component of the after-tax 
cost of using a capital asset is the rate at which it can be 
fully depreciated for tax purposes, which is specified in 
law for U.S. firms. (That rate may differ substantially 
from the rate at which the actual value of the asset 
decreases over time.) 
Under U.S. tax law—unlike that in the other OECD 
countries—the rules for depreciation tend to favor 
investments in machinery over investments in industrial 
structures. Combining those depreciation rules with the 
relatively high U.S. statutory tax rates, the corporate 
income tax in the United States distorts, to a greater 
degree than occurs in most other OECD countries, the 
incentives for marginal investment that are associated 
with the choice between machinery and structures. 
Marginal tax rates in the United States are similar to 
those in other OECD countries for equity-financed 
investments in machinery, they are substantially above 
the average for equity-financed investments in industrial 
structures, and they are substantially below the average 
for debt-financed investments in machinery.4 (Businesses 
finance investments either through equity—by selling 
ownership shares or stock—or through debt.)
4. See Congressional Budget Office, Corporate Income Tax Rates: 
International Comparisons (November 2005). 
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